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I INTRODUCTION" 
On 23 September 1992 the Crown and Maori representatives signed a deed in full and 
final settlement of Maori claims to fishing rights under the Treaty of W aitangi. 1 The deed 
was enacted on 10 December as the Treaty of W aitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 
1992.2 
The Sealord deal was immediately hailed as "an historic seulemenL"3 The Crown had at 
last recognised Maori fishing rights under the Treaty of Waitangi and reached what the 
Crown and the Maori negotiators claim is a fair and honourable resolution. 4 The Sealord 
deal gives Maori a major stake in the New Zealand fishing industry and a significant 
opportunity to get back into the business of fishing.5 The Crown thus claims to have 
fulfilled its Treaty obligations to Maori.6 and in a way that takes Maori beyond "grievance 
mode" to "development mode." 7 This, it is said, is the beginning of "a new era in Crown-
Maori relations.''8 
The Sealord deal, however, has its drawbacks. Major issues have been raised. for 
example, concerning the adequacy of Maori consent and the effective abrogation of Treaty 
rights; and some Maori opposed the deal before the Waitangi Tribunal, the High Coun and 
• This paper incorporates events up to 1 September 1993. 
1 This is commonly called the "Sealord deal" or the "fisheries settlement." These terms will be used 
interchangeably in the paper. 
2Hereafter the "Settlement Act." 
3The Minister of Justice, Hon D Graham, MP quoted by the Speaker: New Zealand Parliamentary 
Debates, Vo! 529, 1992: 11214. 
4Tbe Minister of Justice stated: "From lhe Crown's point of view it discharges an obligation. and we can 
say that we can now lift our heads up because we have acted booourably at lasL" (New Zealand 
Parliamentary Debates Vo! 529, 1992: 11217.) 
5The Sealord deal is worth approximately $0.5 billion: D Graham, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 
Vol 532, 1992: 12817. The Maori share of national quota will be close to 45 per cent: A Leavesley 
"Sharing out the fish" The Evening Post, Wellington, 12 August 1993, 6. 
6The Prime Minister, Rt Hon J Bolger, stated: "We said that we saw the Treaty of Waitangi as the 
founding document of New Zealand. and. consistent with that. an honourable agreement has been 
reached." (New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol 532, 1992: 12827.) The Settlement Act states 
in its preamble that: 
The Crown and Maori wish to resolve their disputes in relation to the fishing rights and 
interests and the quota management system and seek a just and honourable solution in 
conformity with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
7The Sealord deal "will get Maori ... out of the courts, and ... back: into the business of managing their 
fisheries and achieving the economic development potential that it offers" : Mr Graham, New 
Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol 532, 1992: 12817, 12820, 12843. Mr Tipene O'Regan, one of 
the Sealord deal's Maori negotiators, adds: "There is a time to lay down your guns and pick: up your 
tools and trade out into the piece ... il's time for us to swit.ch into growth mode." (P Tumabai 
"Tipene talks on booking the big one" Te Maori N~s. February 1993, 6.) 
8Toe Sealord deal has "caprured the spirit of New Zealand in 1992. It is a spirit that says: 'We want New 
Zealand to go forward."' (Mr Bolger, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol 532, 1992: 12827.) 
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the Court of Appeal, the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, and in 
Parliament 
The Crown and the Maori negotiators have acknowledged the difficulties. This, however, 
was "a tide that had to be taken at the flood."9 As Mr Tipene O'Regan, one of the Maori 
negotiators, explained: 10 
There is a narrow window of opponunily and we don't have time for haggling and puhaehae if 
il is lo be seized. We either do it or we sit on a rod: crying about what might have been for lhe 
next generation or so. 
Ultimately, there was a balance to be struck between principle and practice, theory and 
results: the Crown and the Maori negotiators struck the balance here. The Sealord deal 
was, they argued, in the circumstances of 1993, an appropriate fulfilment of the Treacy of 
Waitangi. Others, however, have dissented. The Sealord deal. they say, reveals a limited 
understanding of the Treaty of W aitangi and an inadequate vision of New Zealand· s 
future. Fundamental principles have been sacrificed for short-term gains. This deal, it is 
argued, must not become the model for future Treacy settlements. 
This paper considers whether the Sealord deal fulfils the Treaty of W aitangi in the 
circumstances of 1993. It develops an account of the principles of the Treacy, based on the 
work of the Waitangi Tribunal and the courts.The paper proceeds in three parts, as 
follows: 
i. Part II develops a f rarnework of principles for Treaty claims settlement which 
will provide the basis for our consideration of the Sealord deal; 
ii. Part III gives the background to the Sea.lord deal and an overview of the 
settlement; and 
iii. Part IV considers the settlement against the Treaty framework, drawing out its 
wider significance for the evolution of the Crown-Maori relationship in New 
Zealand. 
9Te Run.anga O Wharekauri Rekolw Inc v Anomey-Genuai [1993) 2 NZLR 301, 307 ("Te Runanga 0 
WharextllUl"). 
10Maori Fisheries Commission The Seaford Deal - Whal it means for Maori Special Issue, September 
1992. 
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II THE PRINCIPLES OF THE TREATY 
A The Treaty of Waitangi 
The Treaty of Waitangi is New Zealand's founding document and
 its constitutional 
foundation. 11 It is the basis on which two peoples, Maori and Pakeha. a
greed to live in 
one country, New Zealand. 12 When we tum to the Treaty now, h
owever, we are calling 
on it to respond to a situation where its promises have been broke
n, and the intentions and 
expectations of at least its Maori signatories frustrated. Given the 
legacy of the past and 
the reality of the present, how do we honour the Treacy now? It is this q
uestion that the 
Crown and Maori grappled with in the Sealord deal and which co
ncerns us in this paper. 
We consider in this part the principles of the Treaty of W aitangi w
hich guide Treacy claims 
resolution. 13 We look. first, to the principles governing content; 
and, secondly, to those 
which guide procedure. These provide the framework by which w
e shall consider the 
legitimacy of the Sealord deal in Part IV. 
11Toe Treaty of Waitangi is now recognised by the Crown as havin
g this status. The Labour Government 
required all legislation to be assessed against the principles of th
e Treaty of Waitangi: Cabinet 
Office Circular CO (86) 10 of 23 June 1986. The National Govern
ment acknowledges the Treaty as 
New Zealand's founding document: New Zealand National Pa
rty Facing the Future Together 
National Maori Affairs Policy, released 22 July 1990. Both g
overnments have recognised the 
Treaty directly in legislation: see, for example, the State-Owned E
nterprises Act 1986 ("SOE Act"); 
the Resource Management Act 1991; and see further those acts 
detailed in Legislation Advisory 
Committee Legislative Change: Guidelines on Process and Conte
nt (Report No 6, rev ed 1991) 
appendix D. 
12Toe Wai tan gi Tribunal has stressed t.hac 
[11be Treaty was an acknowledgment of Maori existence, of thei
r prior occupation of the land 
and of an intent that the Maori presence would remain and be resp
ected. It made us one country 
but acknowledged that we were two people. [This is] an importa
nt and basic proposition. It is 
fundamental to an understanding of the Treaty of Waitangi. ... It 
established the regime not for 
uni-culturalism but for bi-culturalism. (Waitangi Tribunal Orakei R
epon (Government Printer, 
Wellington, 1987) 130 ("Oraket'); Waitangi Tribunal Motunui-Wa
itara Repon (Government 
Printer, Wellington, 1983) 52 ("Motunui ").) 
13 The basis of this analysis is the "principles" of the Treaty, rath
er than the Treaty text. As Sir Robin 
Cooke explained extra-judicially: 
[11be Treaty is a brief document - a preamble, three articles, a test
imonium - standing for a set 
of embryonic and partly conflicting ideas, which by any normal p
rocess of verbal interpretation 
could not possibly be made to supply answers to the specific pr
oblems of the vastly different 
society existing 150 years later. The courts and the Tribunal a
like, and Parliament itself in 
deciding to refer to principles, have placed in the forefront the
 need to get at the spirit and 
underlying ideas of the Treaty, to apply them as realistically a
nd reasonably as possible in 
current circumstances. (Sir Robin Cooke "Introduction to Specia
l Waitangi Edition" (1990) 14 
NZULR 3.) 
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B The Treaty Obligations 
1 Introduction 
The Treaty of W aitangi is the "foundation for a developing social contract" in New 
7.ealand. 14 The Treaty, however, evolves "to take account of the nation we have become 
and of the gains as well as the disadvantages that have accrued to us over tbc last 147 
years." 15 In this section, we consider how the promises of 1840 translate into the 
principles which guide the resolution of Maori claims in 1993. We look. first, at the basic 
principle of partnership, and, secondly, at the roles which the partners play, as defined by 
the principles of kawanatanga and rangatiratanga. 
2 Partnership 
The Treaty of Waitangi establishes a parmership between the Crown and Maori: 16 
It was the basic object of the Treaty that the two people would live in one country .... The 
Treaty extinguished Maori sovereignty and established that of the Crown. In so doing it 
substituted a charter, or a covenant in Maori eyes, for a continuing relationship between the 
Crown and Maori people, based upon their pledges to one another. It is this that lays the 
foundation for the concept of a parmership. 
Parmership has become the overarching principle representing the parties' Treaty 
obligations. 17 Three ideas are of central importance. 
First, partnership embodies a commitment to biculturalisrn, to a state whose institutions 
uphold both Maori and Pakeha perspectives. 18 Partnership recognises the separate identity 
of the Treaty partners and predicates a sharing of power. 
14Motunui, 52. 
15 New 'Zealand Maon· Council v Attorney-General (1987] 1 NZLR 641, 680 (Richardson J) ("NZMC 
(1987). 
16Muriwhenua, 192. 
17Parmership was given prominence by the Court of Appeal in N7MC (1987), above nl5, 664 (Cooke 
P), 682 (Richardson J). The concept has been affirmed and developed by the Waitangi Tribunal 
(Waitangi Tribunal Muriwhenua Report (Government Printer, Wellington, 1988) 190-191, 193 
("Muriwhenua"); Waitangi Tribunal Ngai Tahu Repon (Government Printer, Wellington, 1991) 
243 ("Ngai Tahu")) and the Court of Appeal (Tainui Maori Trust Board v Attorney-General (1989] 
2 NZLR 513, 527-530 (Cooke P)("Tainui"); New 'Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General 
(1989] 2 NZLR 142, 152-153 ("Forest Assets"); Attorney-General v New 'Zealand Maori Council 
(1991] 2 NZLR 129, 135(Cooke ?)("Airwaves J ")). 
18Tois arises from both Articles II and III. Under Article II, the Maori right to autonomy and conttol over 
their people and resources is affirmed (below Part II B 2 b). Unde.r Article ill, Maori are guaranl.eed 
rights and privileges in common with British subjects. Article ill recognises that Maori interests 
-4-
Secondly, pannership recognises not only separateness but also a common enterprise.19 
We must recognise that there will need to be compromise and co-operation as we move 
from past breaches to honour the Treaty in the future:20 
[B]oth the history and the economy of the nation rule out extravagant claims in the democracy 
now shared. Both parmers should know that a narrow focus on the past is useless. The 
principles of the Treaty have to be applied to give fair results in today's world. 
This is not to advocate the sacrifice of Treaty principles on the basis of convenience, but 
rather to recognise that in defining the Treaty's requirements now, we must work with the 
reality of the presenL 
Thirdly, partnership imposes a responsibility on both partners to act towards each other 
reasonably, honourably, and with the utmost good faith. 21 
2 The Exchange 
The Treaty of Waitangi has, at its base, an exchange.22 By Article I, Maori ceded to the 
Crown sovereignty, or kawanatanga. over New Zealand; by Article II, the Crown 
guaranteed to Maori te tino rangatiratanga and the full, exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of their lands, estates, forests and fisheries and taonga. Article ill established 
the equality of Maori and Pakeha citizens. What do these guarantees mean in 1993? 
must be accorded equal status with those of Pakeha: NZMC (1987), above nl5, 674 (Richardson J ). 
As the Waitangi Tribunal stated: 
Il was inherent in the Treacy· s terms that Maori customary values wouid be proper! y respected, 
but it was also an object of the Treaty to secure a British settlement and a place where cwo 
people couid fully belong. To achieve that end. the needs of both cultures must be provided for, 
and where necessary, reconciled. (Waitangi Tribunal Mangonui Repon (Government Print.er. 
Wellington, 1988) 60 ("Mangonui").) 
19The Waitangi Tribunal stated: 
Both parties expected to gain form the Treaty, the Maori from new technologies and markets. 
non-Maori from the acquisition of settlement rights and both from the cession of sovereignty to 
a supervisory state power. For Maori, access to new markets and technologies necessarily 
assumes a sharing with the settlers who provide them, and for non-Maori, a sharing in 
resources requires that Maori development be not constrained but pe~ even assisted where it 
can be. But neither partner in our view can demand their own benefits if there is not also an 
adherence to reasonable state objectives of common benefiL It ought not to be forgotten that 
there were pledges on both sides. (Muriwhenua, 195.) 
20Tainui , 530 (Cooke P). 
21 N7MC (1987), above nl5, 664,667 (Cooke P); 673, 681-681, 682 (Ric.hardsoo J) . 
22Waitangi Tnlmnal Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Report (Government Printer, Wellington, 1992) 269-273 
("Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries). This is recognised in the preamble lo Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 
1993: 
Whereas the Treaty of Waitangi established the special relationship between the Maori people 
and the Crown: And whereas it is desirable that the spirit of the exchange of kawanatanga for 
rangatiratanga be reaffirmed . . . . 
-5-
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a Kawanatanga 
The Treaty of W aitangi gave to the Crown kawanatang
a:23 the right to govern, to make 
and administer laws, to keep the peace, to create court
s for the resolution of grievances 
and to enforce the law.24 The Crown's sovereignty, ho
wever, is fundamentally limited by 
the terms of the Treaty exchange. 25 
First, kawanatanga is limited by the Crown's obligatio
n to uphold Maori rangatiratanga. 
The Crown may override rangatiratanga in the public i
nterest, but the need for and the 
extent of any claimed public interest powers must be estab
lished. To give an example, the 
Crown has the right to make laws of general applicatio
n for conservation control and 
resource protection.26 The need to regulate a resource
, however, does not in itself 
establish a need to regulate Maori, or to regulate Maor
i in the same way as other resource 
users.27 The difference is that Maori have Treaty righ
ts to certain resources ; others have 
only privileges.28 
Secondly, the Crown's right to govern in the public in
terest is limited by its parmership 
obligations and its duty to respect Maori as equal citize
ns. The Treaty envisaged that the 
Crown would protect both Pakeha and Maori interests
. The cession of sovereignty to the 
Crown did not authorise the conduct of government ba
sed on the "primacy of Anglo-
23Toere has been much debate about whether the Maori ce
ded sovereignty to the Crown in the Treaty . One 
perspective is that Maori, retaining rangatiratanga
 under Article II, kept sovereignty over 
themselves and their resources: see, for example, M Ja
ckson 'Die Maori wui the Criminal Justice 
System (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1988) 71
. The difficulty with this is that it leaves 
little place for Article I. It has thus been accepted by the
 Waitangi Tribunal and the Court of 
Appeal that the Treaty ceded legal sovereignty to the Crown: 
The concept of a national controlling authority with 
kawanatanga (lit. governorship), or the 
power to govern or make laws, was new to Maori .... 
But the supremacy of this new form of 
control was clear. The Queen as guarantor and protecto
r of the Maori interest ... had perforce an 
overriding power .... From the Treaty as a whole it is 
obvious that it does not purport to 
describe a continuing relationship between sovereign st
ates. (Muriwhenua, 186-187.) 
24Ngai Tahu, 236. Maori are obliged to observe the corre
sponding duties of "loyalty to the Queen, full 
acceptance of her Government through here responsible 
ministers, and reasonable co-operation": 
N'llr!C(1987), above nl5, 664 (Cooke P); 682 (Richard
son J). 
250rakei, 149; Ngai Tahu, 236-237. 
26Muriwhenua, 232. 
27With regard to the fisheries, for example, the Waitangi T
ribunal staled that 
Unless absolutely necessary the Crown should not rest
rict the Treaty right fishing of the tribes 
to counteract over-fishing not caused by them even i
f it is necessary to restrict the general 
public fishing, commercial or otherwise (Muriwhenua, 
232; Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries, 242). 
The Waitangi Tribunal drew here on the principles de
veloped in the influential United States decision 
Uniud States v Washington 384 F Supp 312 (1974), 52
0 F 2d 676 (1979) , 506 FSupp 187 
(1980)( "Bo/dJ "). 
28Muriwhenua, 164. 
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Saxon values and institutions."29 Government must embody a commitment to 
biculturalism. 
Balancing the Crown's Article I rights with its obligations under Articles II and III is 
difficulL There will need to be compromise on both sides as we move from a situation of 
past breach to a new recognition of the Treaty. This has led the Court of Appeal to 
emphasise that "the principles of the Treaty do not authorise unreasonable restrictions on 
the right of a duly elected Government to follow its chosen policy."30 The danger, 
however, is more likely to be the other way. Our history has seen not so much the 
unreasonable shackling of the Crown by Maori, as the Crown's refusal to recognise Maori 
rangatiratanga. The key task, it will be argued below, is to develop the full meaning of 
rangatiratanga for New Zealand now. 
b Rangatiratanga 
The Treaty of W aitangi guaranteed to Maori te tino rangatiratanga. in the Maori text, and 
the full, exclusive and undisturbed possession, in the English text, of their lands, forests, 
and fisheries, their taonga. 
We look, first, to the meaning of the rangatiratanga guarantee, secondly, to its breach by 
the Crown, and, thirdly, to how we may begin to honour the Treaty promise in 1993. 
i The Treaty guarantee 
At 184D, the tribe was the basic unit of Maori society, exercising rangatiratanga over its 
people and resources. Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi affinned tribes in this authority, 
subject only to the overriding sovereignty of the Crown. Four key aspects of this Treaty 
guarantee should be emphasised. 
First, the Treaty recognised the tribe as the centrepiece of Maori social organisation: it 
"envisaged a place of respect for the tribe."31 The Treaty thus guaranteed that traditional 
structures and mechanisms for tribal control would be maintained. 32 
29 A Fleras and JL Elliott The Nations Within: Aboriginal-State RelaJions in Canada, the United States 
and New Z'.ealand (Toronto, Oxford Univasity Press, 1992) 181. 
30NZMC(1987), above nl5, 665 (Cooke P). 
31 Mangonui, 47, 60. 
32Mangonui, 47, 60. 
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Secondly, the Treaty guaranteed to Maori possessory rights to their taonga. The Crown 
had, therefore, to acknowledge those rights held by tribes in their resources at 1840. The 
fisheries resource, for example, was an important taonga.33 Maori used the resource both 
for subsistence34 and as an integral part of the tribal economy;35 and tribes exercised 
control over their fisheries in the inshore sea extending out from their territories.
36 The 
Waitangi Tribunal found, therefore, that the tribe had "an exclusive Treaty right to the sea 
fisheries surrounding the whole of their coastal rohe to a distance of 12 miles or so there 
being no waiver or agreement by them to surrender such rights."
37 
Thirdly, the Crown had an obligation to actively protect Maori interests in their taonga:38 
It was a principle of the Treaty that the Crown would ensure that Macri retained sufficient for 
their needs; that despite settlement Maori would survive and because of it they would also
 
progress.39 
The Crown thus had to ensure that tribes retained an adequate tribal endowment of 
resources.4() The Crown had also to help tribes to develop these resources in line with 
33 As the Waitangi Tribunal stated; "Maori involvement with fish and fishing is as ancient as the c
reation 
and Maori fishing embraces not only the physical but also the spiritual. social, and cultural 
dimensions." (Muriwhenua. xi, 202.) 
See generally Law Commission The Treary of Waitangi arui Maori Fisheries - Preliminary Paper No 9 
(Wellington, 1989). 
34Maori used marine resources - fish, seaweed, kina. marine mammals - for food, and also for 
ornamentation, clothing, weaponry, and fertiliser: Treaty of Waitangi ( Fisheries Clai
ms) 
Settlement Bill: Submissions on behalf of Te Runanga O Wharekauri Rekohu. undated paper, on 
file with the writer. 
35Tribes traded amongst themselves and with other iwi in a system of gift exchange: ·'although conducted 
along distinctive lines, it was trade and commerce nonetheless." (Muriwhenua, 45 .) Gift excha
nge 
adapted after European settlement to barter and sale, and tribes traded with visiting ships. and l
ater 
supplied settlements. Ngai Tahu, for example, may have been exporting as far as Australia by the 
late 1830's (Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries, 291); Muriwhenua uibes in the 1850's were supply
ing 
Auckland with thousands of kits of oysters each year (Muriwhenua, 82). 
36Toe Waitangi Tribunal found tha1 "each tribe had complete dominion over the land and foreshore - mana 
wbenua - and over such part of the sea as they exercised mana moana"-.Ngai Talw Sea Fisheries. 
100. Tribes exercised effective control over the inner sea only, although they occasiooally fished
 
further out. 
37 Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries, 264. The Treaty right was not an exclusive right to fish, but r
ather to 
maintain the tribe's business and activity of fishing without interference from other users or fro
m 
pollution. The Crown had, therefore, to negotiate for any major public user. Neither the sale of 
land nor the sharing of the fisheries with Pakeha constituted a diminuition or modification
 of 
rangatiratanga (Muriwherwa, 216-220.) 
38Toe principle of active protection was established by the Waitangi Tribunal in Manukau (70) and 
Waitangi Tribunal Te Rea Repon (Government Print.er, Wellington, 1986) 1 ("Te Rea"), and 
it is 
affirmed in every subsequent repon. The principle was accepted by the Court of Appeal in NZ
MC 
(1987): "mhe duty of the Crown is not merely passive but extends to active protection of Ma
ori 
people in the use of their lands and waters to the fullest extent practicable." ( Above nl6, 
664 
(Cooke P).) 
39Muriwhenua, 217. 
40nie retention right was developed by Chief Judge Durie in Waiheke in relation to land: 
Waitangi 
Tribunal Waiheke Repon (Government Printer, Wellington, 1987) 36-42 ("Waiheke "). It was 
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new technologies and understandings.4 1 With regard to the fisheries resource, therefore, 
the tribe had "a Treaty development right to a reasonable share of the sea fisheries off their 
rohe extending beyond 12 miles out to and beyond the continental shelf into the deep 
water fisheries within the 200 mile economic zone such right being exclusive to [that 
tribe]." 42 
Fourthly, rangatiratanga extended beyond possession to the management and control of 
taonga and those who use taonga. With regard to the fisheries resource, for example, 
Maori followed established fishing practices "based principally on respect for life, the 
seabed, the water, and the gods associated with the fish and the seas."
43 They maintained 
the resource by requiring the seasonal capture of many species and the seasonal use of 
some fishing grounds, providing for the imposition of tapu and rahui to protect breeding 
areas and threatened species, and laying down regulations concerning fishing practice. 
The Treaty guaranteed to Maori the right to continue in the management of themselves and 
their resources to the extent that that was compatible with kawanatanga. 
44 
The Treaty thus looked forward to a shared future of prosperity in New Zea.land where 
Maori tribes and Pakeha seulers would develop within their own structures and the Crown 
would protect the interests of both. 
ii Breach of the Treaty 
The Crown did not honour its obligations under Article II of the Treaty of W aitangi. The 
Treaty's spirit of accommodation and reciprocity soon disappeared in the face of settler 
greed. The Pakeha wanted land, resources and control, not competition with strong, 
successful and developing Maori tribes; Maori wanted the Treaty promise of 
rangatiratanga honoured. 45 That clash of expectations led to the New Z.ealand Wars in the 
affirmed generally by the Tribunal in Muriwhenua (194), Ngai Tahu(237-240), and Oralcei (13
7-
147). This right was sourced in the Treaty text and in the parties' understandings. 
41 The development right was evolved by the Waitangi Tribunal in Muriwhenua and Ngai Tahu Se
a 
Fisheries . The Tribunal emphasised Lord Normanby's instructions which "clearly envisaged t
hat 
Maori would profit from the development of those properties they retained", the concu
rring 
understandings of the Maori sigruuories, and principles of international law: Muriwhenua, 2
17; 
Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries, 253-256. 
42Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries, 306. 
43Muriwhenua, 200. 
44The Waitangi Tribunal has established this as representing the understandings of both Treaty p
artners: 
The explanations at Treaty signings support the conclusion that though Maori expected th
e 
Treaty to initiate a new relationship, it would be one in which Maori and Pakeha would shar
e 
authority .... Maori were encouraged to believe that their rangatiratanga would be enhanced 
... 
and that Maori control over tribal matters would remain. (Muriwhenua, 190 (citing Claudia 
Orange The Treaty of Waitangi) 231-2; Mangonui, 47, 60; Ngai Tahu, 242.) 
45 See MPK Sorrenson "Maori and Pakeha" in GW Rice (ed)The Oxford History of New Zealan
d (2ed, 
Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1992) 141. 
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1860's. After the wars, the Crown was determined to destroy Maori rangatiratanga. The 
aim was the assimilation of Maori,46 detribalisation;H and the acquisition of the tribal 
resources, in particular land. The Treaty became. in practice as well as (supposedly) in 
law, "a simple nullity."48 
The result of this fundamental breach of the Treaty of W aitangi was the near desuuction of 
the tribe. Iwi lost their lands and resources, and thus their economic viability. Later, they 
lost their people: "[d]uring the second half of the (twentieth] century more than seventy 
per cent of the Maori population shifted to the cities. often breaking the link with their 
turangawaewae, dispersing the whanau and Hapu, and threatening the tribal identity 
which was at the heart of being Maori."49 Rangati.ratanga was unutterably diminished. 
We are faced now with the legacy of the Treaty's breach. Comparisons between Maori 
and non-Maori today reveal alarming disparities in health, education, housing, 
employment. crime, monality, and incarceration.so We have now, in seeking to honour 
the Treaty, the opportunity to reverse this and to re-establish Maori mana 
iii Rangatiratanga in 1993 
We are faced in 1993 with the question: given the legacy of the past and the reality of the 
present. how do we affinn Maori rangatiratanga? We look, in this section, fust. to the 
basis for Treaty claims resolution and, secondly, to a method of approach. 
46rrbe House of Representatives passed the following resolution in 1862: 
Resolved: That in the adoption of any policy, or the passing of any Jaws affecting the Native 
race, This House will keep before it, as its highest object, the entire amalgamation of all Her 
Majesty's subjects in New Zealand. (New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 1862: 483-4.) 
The official policy changed in the late 1950's from assimilation to integration: see the Hunn Repon 1962. 
Many doubted., however, whether there was much difference: "tribe" was still "an anachronism" and 
"Maori authority was better defined by Pakeha structures": IH Kawharu "Introduction" in I H 
Kawharu (ed) Waitangi - Maori and Pakeha Perspectives (Oxford University Press, Auckland. 1989) 
xii. 
47Toe Minister of Justice staled in 1870 that 
The other great object was the detribalisatioo of the Maoris - to destroy if it were possible. the 
principle of communism which ran through the whole of their institutions. upon which their 
social system was based, and which stocxi as a barrier in the way of all attempts to amalgamate 
the Maori rare into our social and political system. (New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol 
IX, 1870: 361.) 
48 Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington and the Attorney-General (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72. 
49J Kelsey Rolling Back the State (Bridget Williams Books. Wellington, 1993) 247 . By 1981, 80.3 per 
cent of Maori were living in cities: Ministerial Planning Group, 1991. 
5°MH Durie 'The Treaty of Waitangi: perspectives on social policy" in Kawharu. Waitangi , above o46, 
280, 285-287. We may question also whether this does not represent a breach of the Article III 
guarantee. 
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1 Basis 
The basic Treaty obligation in 1993 is the restoration of the tribe. This is not only the 
means of honouring the Treaty for the future, but also of making redress for the pasL As 
Chief Judge Durie stated in Waiheke:5 1 
To compensate a tort is only one way of feeling with a cwrent problem. Another is Lo move
 
beyond guilt and ask what can be done now and in the future to re-build the tribes and furnish 
those needing it with the land endowmems necessary for their own tribal programmes. Tha
t 
approach seems more in keeping with the spirit of the Treaty and with those founding tenets 
that did not see the loss of tribal identity as a necessary consequence of Ewopean seulemenL It 
releases the Treaty to a modem world, where it begs to be re-affirmed. and unshackles il from 
the ghosts of an uncertain pasL52 
Tribal restoration is, in fact, at the heart of Maori claims.
53 Maori want to re-establish their 
communities, to regain their lands and other taonga. to develop their economic bases, to 
rescue their people from social and economic dislocation, and to reclaim autonomy within 
the state,54 though the traditional vehicle of the tribe.55 Maori thus require redress that 
focuses on this goal and which ensures its achievemenL 
56 
51 Waiheke, 41 (Chief Judge Durie). The Waitangi Tribunal stated in Orakei that il is the restoratio
n of iwi 
that musl be the focus of redress now, nol reparation (186). 
52In this way, we "uphold the Treary not just as a reminder of 'colonial bad faith ' bul as a sy
mbol of 
'bicullural good faith"' (R Mulgan "Can the Treaty Provide a Constilutional Basis for Ne
w 
Zealand's Political Fulw-e" (1989) 41 Political Science 65.) 
53 Muriwhenua, xxi, 3. Maori Treaty claims "are a response to current feelings of cultural., econom
ic and 
political powerlessness. They are not pw-ely backward looking." (J Williams, quoted in Kelsey
, 
Roiling Back The Stale, above n49, 270.) 
54Ngai Tahu provides a prominent example. Toe tribe released on 13 May 1992 its "vision for the future" 
- "a multi-million dollar programme aimed at eliminating Maori dependence on the state
 and 
securing the economic future of [Ngai Tahu]." Ngai Tahu aims to achieve social development 
through financial independence, and intends to operate education, employment, train
ing, 
superannuation, health, and housing schemes. The plan relies heavily on a beneficial settleme
m of 
the Ngai Tahu land and fisheries claims: "Tribe unveils its 'vision'" The Dominion, Wellingto
n, 
14 May 1992, 12. 
55CHECKThe place of the tribe has been affirmed by Maori on a national level. The Nation
al Maori 
Congress was formed in June 1990 as the "national expression of tino rangatiratanga of the tribes" 
in contrast to the regionally based New Zealand Maori Council: Kelsey, Rolling Back the Sta
l~. 
above n49, 245. The Crown has also affirmed the tribe: the Labour Government proposed 
the 
devolution of government programmes to iwi (He Tirohanga Rangapu (Pannership Perspectiv
es) 
1988). 
56The Waitangi Tribunal gave tribal restoration as its primary recommendation in Muriwhenua (228, 239-
240) and N gai Tahu ( 1051-1059), both of which were large resource claims. The Tribunal has also 
recognised that., behind claims seemingly more narrowly focused. there is often the basic griev
ance 
of tribal destruction: Mangonui, 61-67; Waiheke, 42. 
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It must be emphasised, however, that tribal restoration is not "social welfare" ,
57 nor does 
it point towards some global compensation scheme.
58 It is an appropriate means of 
respecting rangatiratanga in 1993. It also formally acknowledges each tribe's grievances 
as the basis for restoring the mana of the tribe and the honour of the Crown.59 As Chief
 
Judge Durie emphasised:6() 
I doubt many Maori will be able lO seek the road ahead until the road behind has
 been cleared 
for we are as a people lod:::ed into histcxy. There is a Maori opinion that your future lies beh
ind 
you for what in fact confronts you is your past and we are still largely constrain
ed by that 
opinion. 
There is, on the concept of tribal restoration, the opportunity to fulfil the spirit of th
e 
Treaty of Waitangi in 1993. The Treaty may then emerge as "a central unifying for
ce, 
providing a cultural frame of reference for renewal of Maori-state relations along li
nes of 
parmership and power-sharing."61 Restoration of the tribe has become the Crown
's 
overarching Treaty obligation in the late twentieth cenwry. 
2 Method 
There are three main components of tribal restoration: the reconstruction of the trib
al 
resource base; the return of tribal autonomy; and the restructuring of the tribe. These are 
considered in turn below. 
57 As has been claimed by some. Mr O'Regan writes: 
In recent decisions ... the Tribunal has chosen to assess remedy on the basis of 'need' ra
ther 
than on a basis of the value of lost property rights ... Whilst such a basis might possibly 
be 
relevant to the settlement of an issue under Article 3 (general citizenship and equal rights
) .. . 
the 'needs principle' rests uneasily with the expression in Article 2 of guarantee for 
' full, 
exclusive and undisturbed possession' of Maori properties which they wish 
to retain. (T 
O'Regan ''Old Myths and New Politics" [1992] 26 New Zealand Journal of History 5, 
10-11. 
This is based, however, on a misunderstanding of the tribal restoration analysis . 
58As is proposed by some: see JE Gould '"Big bang' move on Waitangi" The Dominion , We
llington, 27 
July 1993. 
59 As the Minister of Justice recognised: 
[Y]ou have to say the Crown is wrong and we're sorry. We haven ' t done
 that before, 
unbelievable though il is. It's not bard lO do and once it's done you are halfway there. (C Br
ett 
"Who Are Ngai Tahu and What Do They Really Want?" North and South , New
 Zealand, 
November 1992, 56, 60.) 
6°Chief Judge Durie "The Waitangi Tribunal - its relationship with the judicial
 system" [1986] NZU 
235, 236. 
61 Fleras and Elliott, above n29, 218. 
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a Tribal base 
Reconstruction of the tribe involves restoring economic self-determ
ination. The tribe must 
have a resource base that enables it to provide for its present and f
uture needs. The Crown 
must help both to provide the necessary resources and to ensure th
at the tribe is able to 
develop from this basis. 
The particular resources needed will depend on each tribe's particu
lar circumstances. As 
the Waitangi Tribunal commented with regard to Muriwhenua:
62 
A programme of tribal restoration requires. in our opinion, a review 
of the total tribal resources 
and tbe interrelationships between the tribes. Muriwhenua has a small lan
d mass and poor soils 
but an extensive coastline. There the resources of the sea have special sign
ificance, and land and 
sea have traditionally been worked together. 
The economic base will thus involve the interplay of a number of 
resources, including 
capital.63 One resource cannot be considered in isolation. This point was ma
de by the 
Waitangi Tribunal with regard to both Ngai Tahu
64 and Muriwhenua:65 
The Tribunal has also considered that a comprehensive analysis 
of the Muriwhenua tribe's 
situation should be made - that is, of their land and fishing claims
 together, so that relief might 
be seen in terms of a total package proposal for the restoration
 of the Muriwhenua tribes 
through their land and sea resources. The adequacy of those resourc
es needs to be reviewed and 
the capability of those resources to service those needs .... We h
ave therefore been reluctant Lo 
proceed with the Fisheries matter by itself. 
62Muriwhenua, 3. The Waitangi Tribunal commented in Ngai Tahu: 
Ngai Tahu is plainly entitled to very substantial compensat
ion .... It would need Lo be 
sufficiently substantial to enable Ngai Tahu, now a numerous tr
ibe, IO be able significantly to 
enhance the social, educational and economic well being of its 
people. Whether the tribe opts 
for the purchase on the open market of viable farm properties in su
itable locations, or for the 
establishment or purchase of commercial ventures offering emp
loyment for its people, or for 
other forms of investment or economic activity, or for a combinatio
n of some or all of these. is 
of course for Ngai Tahu to decide. (1056). 
63Land will be in many cases the primary resource required. The reduction o
f tribal estates from 27 
million hectares to 13 million hectares has left some tribes landless, and m
ost with a small 
amount of poor quality land held llllder fragmented titles: G Asher an
d D Naulls Maori Land (New 
Zealand Planning Council, Planning Paper No 29, 1987). 
64Ngai Tahu, 1054-1057. 
65Memorandum of Tribunal's preliminary opinions as convey
ed to Hon Minister of Fisheries. 30 
September 1987 (reproduced in Muriwhenua, 295). The Tribunal was, h
owever, forced by events IO 
give priority to fisheries: Muriwhenua, xi. 
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The Treaty right being upheld here is the right to a resource base, and not specifically the 
right to the return of resources wrongly taken. The tribal restoration approach is not a 
property rights compensation analysis: 66 
A return to the 1840's is ruled out. There can be no attempt to restore to Maori either all the 
holdings and resources that were theirs then or their full equivalent value. Instead the emphasis 
is on the present position of disadvantage suffered by the Maori people. 
Treaty claims settlement must work through the past in order to grapple with a perspective 
for the future. 67 
A number of factors will need to be balanced in finding an appropriate tribal base: the 
tribe's interest in particular resources over which rangatiratanga was traditionally exercised 
and the desire to be re-established in the economy of its traditional territory; the tribe's 
need for sound investments now; and the fiscal realities of the Crown. A tribal base could 
include, for example, a senlement of traditional lands, a share in commercial fishing 
quota, shares in Coalcorp, and an amount of investment capital. 
It is the development of this restored resource base, however, which will determine the 
long-term success of tribal restoration. The Crown's assistance will be critical. Maori may 
lack managerial and entrepreneurial skills, and "tribal kin-based systems are poorly placed 
at this stage to meet the expectations either of Government or of their beneficiaries."68 The 
return of resources alone is no guarantee of tribal restoration. 69 
It will also be important to ensure that development is "driven by Maori sensitivities and 
priorities rather than that of the dominant sector."70 'True" Maori development , as 
Cooper writes, "has as its goals the restoration and reconciliation of we Maori people with 
our lands and the promotion of our self-determined advancement in life, according to our 
own Maori human values and ideals."71 The Crown must be sensitive to these needs.72 
66Mulgan, above n52, 60. 
67Chief Judge Durie 'The Waitangi Tribunal; Its relationship with the judicial system", above n60, 237. 
68Kawharu "Introduction", above n46, xiv . .Kawbaru further warns: 
[!lo recognise the existence of a few professionally qualified tribal individuals in secure 
employment elsewhere, to recognise a rise in awareness of tribal identity, and even lO 
acknowledge that a few ad luJc explorations into the world of commerce have survived is not to 
see a cadre of tribal authorities ready for a pannership today. 
69Tribes will need varying levels of assistance. Some, such as Ngai Tahu, may only need the resources 
from which to build. Most tribes, however, have far less expertise. experience and organisation, and 
will need considerable Crown development assistance. 
7Dfleras and Elliott, above n29, 180. 
71 R Cooper for the Maori Council of Churches, quoted in Kelsey, Rolling Back the Stale, above n49, 
251. 
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b Tribal auwnomy 
Rangatiratanga includes a right to tribal autonomy. The Crown must restore to the tribes 
control over their resources and those who use them. The Crown and Maori must work 
together to establish the functions and services that can be performed by the tribe 
consistently with kawanatanga, and arrange for their devolution: resource control is likely 
to be important as is tribal provision of parallel services such as health and education. 
There must, however, be a real commiunent to power-sharing. Devolution is not 
delegation or decentralisation 73 or "a private-sector delivery mechanism for social 
services."74 This has not been adequately appreciated thus far in New Zealand.75 
c Tribal structure 
Reconstruction of the tribe requires a structure appropriate for the needs of Maori now. 
76 
There are major unresolved questions here. The Crown and Maori must work through 
these as a matter of priority.77 
72Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 is an example of the Crown's attempt to grapple with this issue. The 
Act is intended to balance the kaupapa of retention of Maori lands with the need to facilitate their 
development: preamble, Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. 
73"Devolution" is defined by Fleras and Elliott as: 
[A] murually agreed upon transfer of jurisdiction ... from a higher level of government . . . to a 
lower ... . Ideally, the "periphery" is not necessarily subordinate to the centre; nor are the 
powers so transferred subject to unilateral recall by the centre . .. . (D]evolution is about power-
sharing and restructuring . . . . (Above n30, 204 (references omitted).) 
Local government, for example, has devolved powers which it is free to exercise inside the broad 
constraints of the statutory regimes. Rangatiratanga has been analogised to local government: 
Muriwhenua, 187. "Delegation" and "decentralisation", however, are where duties and 
responsibilities are transferred out, but power remains in the centre: Fleras and Elliott, above n29, 
204. 
74Kelsey, Rolling Back the State, above n49, 273 . See also Mr O'Regan. quoted in "Ngai Tahu: Into the 
21st Century" Race Gender Class, New Zealand, December 1989, 97, 99-100. 
75Toe Labour Government was nominally committed to iwi devolution and passed the Runanga Iwi Act 
1990 as the structural framework for devolution. It had, however, no intention of providing 
independent iwi control over policy and resources at a level of equality with the Crown. As Fleras 
and Elliott comment: 
While the tangata whenua talk about parallel development and separate institutions, the central 
authocities talk about tinkering with the existing system by way of Maori add-ons. The clash of 
these paradigms is likely to aggravate the difficulty of restructuring Maori-government relations 
in a rapidly decolonising Aotearoa. (Above n29, 207-208). 
The National Government has since backed away from "devolution", has repealed the Runanga lwi Act, 
and is focusing on the mainstreaming of Maori affairs: Kelsey, Rolling Back the State, above n49, 
276. 
76The Waitangi Tribunal stated in Mangonui that the Crown "must provide a legally recognisable form of 
tribal rangatiralanga or management. a rangatiratanga that the Treaty promised to uphold." (5) 
77There was an attempt to grapple with these issues in the Runanga Iwi Act 1990. Toe Act recognised iwi 
for the purposes of devolution of government services and provided, amongst other things, for a 
process of identifying the iwi with authority in an area. and for iwi accountability structures. There 
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First. there is a difficulty concerning the entity which represents Maori.
78 Who is the 
Crown's Treaty partner, the hapu or the iwi? There would seem to be no one answer here: 
the hapu will have primary importance at the level of traditional use and guardianship; the 
iwi becomes significant in the case of commercial operations and "matters of common 
policy affecting the people generally."79 There may also be issues which have to be 
determined at a pan-iwi level. 80 There is a need for an understanding between Crown and 
Maori of which issues require which level of representation. 
Secondly, who has the authority to represent the hapu or iwi? Representation has been 
emphasised by the Waitangi Tribunal:81 
Modem circumstances compel the need for legally cognisable forms of tribal instirutions with 
authority to represent the tribe on local [and nationa1]
82 issues and adequate resources to assist 
the formulation of tribal opinion. 
At present, there is no certainty as to the suucture which represents the iwi or hapu in a 
particular area. There are a number of bodies which may be important: the trust board, the 
Maori council, the local branch of the Federation of Maori Authorities, the runanga, and 
the kahui ariki, the council of elders.83 There is thus a major difficulty for the Crown in 
undertaking consultation or achieving consent in accordance with its Treaty obligations. 
84 
was, however, significant Maori concern that the Runanga were Pakeha defined constructs with
out 
Maori legitimacy: Kelsey, Rolling Back the Stale, above n49. 272-273. 
78Tois issue has been raised recently by groups such as Ngai Tuhuru and Wait.aha from Nga
i Tahu; 
Rangitane from Ngati Kahungunu; Te Runanga o Paiea from Ngati Porou; and Pakakohi fr
om 
Taranaki who seek independent status: T O'Regan "Old Myths and New Politics", above n58, 
16; 
Waitangi Tribunal The Fisheries Settlement Repon (Government Printer. Wellington, 1992)
 12 
(" Fisheries Settlemenc"); "Maori split widens on eve of Sealord deal hui" The Dominw
n, 
Wellington, 16 February 1993, 1. 
79 Fisheries Settlement, 13. Dissentient hapu may, therefore, be bound by an iwi decision. The
re must. 
however, be a means of determining whether a particular hapu has come to have iwi status. 
80Dissentient iwi may, therefore, be bound by a majority decision. The Waitangi Tribunal has 
emphasised, however, that where rights are to be extinguished. only consenting groups should
 be 
bound: Fisheries Settlement, 17. 
81Mangonui, 48. 
82Fisheries Settlement, 15. 
83 In Te Arawa, for example, there appear to be three separate bodies with standing - a trust b
oard, a 
runanga and the local branch of FOMA: Fisheries Settlement, 14. 
84Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 will be important here. Section 30 of the Act gives the Ma
ori Land 
Court the power, at the request of various people, to determine who "are the most appropri
ate 
representatives of any class or group of Maori" affected by any proceedings, negotiatio
ns. 
consultation, or allocation. It should not be taken from this, however, that the problem can sim
ply 
be left to the Maori Land Court. The court does not have the resources to deal promptly with eve
ry 
representation issue as it arises . The Crown and Maori must make an effort to set a ba
sic 
framework for resolving these issues outside the judicial process. 
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lnirdly, there is a need for appropriate tribal administrative and legal soucrures. Tribes are 
now operating within souctures which are incapable of meeting today's objectives.
85 It is 
imponant to find soucrures which give the tribe the ability to function effectively 
commercially, to exercise autonomous functions, to participate in decision-making and 
consultation. to be accountable to its people, and to contribute to an effective parmership 
with the Crown. 86 What is required with respect to these functions will have to be 
determined between the Crown and Maori. 
Finally, we must consider the majority of Maori, who now live in urban centres outside 
their traditional tribal boundaries. Tribal restoration claims urgency on the basis of their 
needs. We must ensure, therefore, that tribal structures include provision for passing real 
benefits to urban tribal members, and have means of identifying them. There are difficult 
and charged issues here and we have not yet grappled adequately with them. We must do 
so if tribal restoration is really to provide the "window of opponunity'' for the 
dispossessed children of Otara and Porirua. and not just a windfall for the few. 
iv Conclusion 
The Treaty of W aitangi guaranteed Maori rangatiratanga. We now seek to honour that 
promise in the circumstances of 1993. 'lrus is a considerable challenge and we should not 
under-estimate its difficulty.87 We have in it, however, the opponunity to build the basis 
for a stable bicultural future. 
85Toe Maori Trust Boards were set up in the 1940's to administer tribal compensation funds. More 
recently, tribal runanga were set up under the now repealed Runanga Iwi Act 1990 to receive 
devolved government services (above n75). None of these suuctures have provided Maori with 
administrative and legal structures appropriate for Maori needs as perceived by Maori now: T 
O'Regan "The Ngai Tahu Claim" in Kawharu (ed) Waitangi, above n46, 234, 259-260. 
86Ngai Tahu has recognised strucrure as fundamental: O'Regan "The Ngai Tahu Claim", above n86, 254-
261. Te Runanga O Ngai Tahu Bill, introduced to Parliament on 27 July 1993, is intended to deal 
with these issues. The Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board is to be dissolved and the Runanga recognised 
as the representative of Ngai Tahu with its own legal personality. The Minister of Maori Affairs, 
Hon D Kidd MP, stated in introducing the Bill that the Runanga is "a uniquely Macri organisation" 
designed by Ngai Tahu for its own social, cultural and commercial needs: "Treaty claims spurs 
Ngai Tahu change" The Evening Post, Wellington, 28 July 1993, 23. The Ngai Tahu model may 
not, however, be appropriate for all tribes, and there must be a Crown commitment to deal with the 
structural needs of those besides Ngai Tahu. 
87In Tainui, above n18, Cooke P stated that "[i]t is as well to stress that [the principles of the Treaty] are 
of limited scope and do not require a social revolution." (527) This may have been politically 
expedient, but it may have given a false impression. 
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4 Overview 
We have developed in this section the key Treaty principles of partnership, kawanatanga. 
and rangatiratanga. 1bis is the substantive basis on which this paper will assess the 
content of the Sealord deal. 
C The Process of Settlement 
The Treaty of Waitangi provides the basic framework on which to base Crown-Maori 
interaction in general and the resolution of Treaty claims in particular. The Treaty does 
no t, however, define the practical application of its principles in the circumstances of 
1993.88 There is a need, therefore, to think carefully about the institutions which will be 
imponant in claims resolution, and the way in which they operate. The process of Treaty 
claims settlement must be given as much attention as the content of settlements. 
In this section, we look, first. to the choice of procedure and, secondly, to the specific 
features of the negotiation process. 
1 The Treaty claims process 
There are three main institutions involved in the process of Treaty claims settlement: direct 
negotiation between the Crown and Maori, the Waitangi Tribunal, and the couns. We 
consider here the respective roles of these institutions. 
Negotiation has come to be seen as the most appropriate means by which to determine the 
practical application of Treaty principles. The understanding is that as the Crown and 
Maori entered into the Treaty, only they have the mana to define its requirements.
89 Treaty 
issues are ultimately political matters which can only be legitimately resolved in the 
political realm by the parties themselves. This is recognised in practice by the Waitangi 
Tribunal90 and the courts.91 
88Toe Treaty "lacks the precision of a legal contract and is more in the nature of an agreement to seek 
arrangements along broad guidelines": Chief Judge Durie "Part II and Clause 26 of the Draft New 
Zealand Bill of Rights" in Legal Research Foundation A Bill of Rights/or New Zealand (Auckland, 
1985) 175, 190. 
89nie Waitangi Tribunal stated in Muriwhenua that we do not "seek to take from the tribes the mana to 
effect their own arrangements, in accordance with the Treary's guarantee." (241) 
9°Tbe Waitangi Tribunal recognises the legitimacy of the now common request from claimants for 
findings of fact and Treaty interpretation only, not substantive recommendations, as the basis for 
Crown negotiations: Muriwhenua, xxi; Ngai Tahu, 1061; Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries, 309. 
9 1Cooke P stated in Tainui, that "[p]referably - and I am confident that the Waitangi Tribunal would agree 
with this - the Treaty partners should work out their own agreement." (Above nl 7, 529). In 
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The Waitangi Tribunal has a key role in providing the theoretical basis for negotiation. The 
Tribunal does not have the practical ability to determine the Treaty' s requirements in other 
than a few cases.92 Its importance is in its contribution to an effective negotiation process; 
to establishing the factual matrix of the claim;93 and to developing our understandings of 
the Treaty and its requirements now.94 The Tribunal also provides an ongoing check on 
the continuing validity of Treaty claims settlements. 
The courts protect the Treaty claims settlement process. They act as a safeguard on 
Crown-Maori interaction and ensure procedural legitimacy.95 As McHugh writes:96 
[There is a danger of the Treaty being) assigned to a legal vacuum. or, more accurately, ghetto. 
where it is viewed solely and simply as a policy document. It is depicted as a ··pact" requiring a 
Parliamentary response, yet one otherwise bereft of legal consequence. There is in that approach 
a hidden and ultimately condesc.ending palriarchism. Whatever Maori may have agreed to when 
they signed the Treaty, they certainly did not agree to an absolute Hobbesian sovereignty being 
vested in the Crown. 
The courts do not, however, have a substantive role in Treaty settlements. First, they do 
not have the constitutional legitimacy to perform this function.9
7 They must operate within 
practice, the Court has always left the Crown and Maori to together negotiate a senlemem. It has 
not made a substantive determination of the Treaty 's requirements. Compare below n97. 
92Toe Waitangi Tribunal has binding jurisdiction only under the State-Owned Enterprises (Treaty of 
Waitangi) Act 1988 and the Crown Forest Assets Act 1989. This, according to its Chairman. is as 
it should be: "Given the political nature of most of [the claims], I do not think it should [be so 
empowered)." ('The Waitangi Tribunal: Its relationship with the judicial system".above n60, 236.) 
93Tois is important; as the Waitangi Tribunal stated in Manukau, those "who [do) not know the past will 
never understand the presem."(46-47) See MPK Sorrenson ''Towards a Radical Reimerpretatioo of 
New Zealand History: The Role of the Waitangi Tribunal" in Kawharu Waitang1, above n46, 158. 
94Toe Tribunal is also able to recognise the Treaty as "a political st.atement of policy", and thereby to 
develop Treaty principles in a way not open to the courts. This was highlighted by the different 
conclusions in Fisheries Selllement and Te Runanga a Wharekauri. above n9, discussed in Pan III 
B 2 a below. 
95Toe Legislation Advisory Commiuee has emphasised that "the history of freedom is largely the history 
of procedural safeguards": Legis/aJive Change, above n 11 . 
96P(} McHugh "Constitutional Myths and the Treaty of Waitangi" [1991) NZU 316; see also PG 
McHugh "The role of Jaw in Maori claims" [1990) NZl.J 16. 
97Toe Court of Appeal appeared initially to challenge this. with Cooke P in Tainui stating that '' (i]n the 
end only the Courts can finally rule on whether or not a particular solution accords with the Treaty 
principles" (above n 17, 529). The Crown· s response was immediate. The Deputy Prime Minister, 
Rt Hon G Palmer (as he then was), made the constitutional position clear: 
The Courts are an essential part of New Zealand's constitutional arrangements. They have 
provided in recent years justice for Maori clams against the Government Some imaginative and 
constructive resolutions have been achieved. These should nOl be forgotten, nor should they be 
rejected. The Courts are imponant They will continue to be imponant. But the Courts 
interpret lhe Jaw. They do not legislate. They do not govern. The Executive governs. On 
mauers resulting to the Treaty of Waitangi the Courts cannol govern. (G Palmer, speech at Tc 
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the existing frameworks of the state.98 Secondly, the couns are able to deal with Treaty 
claims in terms of legal rights only.99 The Treaty , however, is not "just a potential 
source of particular legal rights for indigenous peoples, but a political statement of 
policy." 100 A legal approach alone misses the essence of the Treaty. Thirdly, the couns 
are constrained by legal remedy structures which focus on past wrongs, rather than future 
benefits. Fourthly, in terms of approach, the couns are locked in to an adverserial, 
winner-take-all process which is inappropriate for a developing social contract. The Court 
of Appeal could not, for example, have achieved the Sealord deal. 
2 The negotiation process 
The Treaty's basic procedural principle is that the parmers must act towards each other 
reasonably, honourably, and with the utmost good faith. What does this require of the 
parties in the negotiation of Treaty claims senlements? We focus here on three problem 
areas: the imbalance of bargaining power, aspects of Maori representation; and the public 
acceptability of the negotiation process. There must be a commitment by the Crown and 
Maori to working together through these issues.1°1 
Awamarahi Marae, Tuakau, 24 November 1989, quoted in Kelsey , Rolling Back the Stare , 
above n49, 215; (1989) 12 TO... 45/1.) 
The Court of Appeal has since backed away from the Tainui statement. In Airwaves 1, above nl8, all the 
judges, except Cooke P, made it clear that they were applying orthodox administrative law. In New 
Zealand MMri Council v Allorney-General [ 1992] 2 NZLR 576 ("Airwaves 2"), the majority 
emphasised that the court "does not have either the power or the responsibility ... to direct the 
Crown on matters of policy." (598) In Te Runanga O Wharekauri, above n9, the Court found that 
the issues '"are political questions for politicaljudgment" (309) 
98As Kelsey states: "The Pakeha legal system could never deliver te lino rangatirat.anga for to do so would 
be to deny the legitimacy of the state of which it was an integral part." (J Kelsey A Question of 
Honour ? Lnbour and the Treaty 1984-1989 (Wellington, Allen and Unwin, 1990) 210.) 
99-rbe court is thus constrained by the need for statutory incorporation of the Treaty (NZMC(l987), above 
nl5; Love v Allorney-Genera/ Unreported, 17 November 1988, High Court Wellington Registry 
CP 135/88), notions of justiciability and parliamentary sovereignty (Te Runanga O Wharekauri , 
above n9), and the limitations of the aboriginal tille analysis, if that is resorted to (Te Weehi v 
Regional Fisheries Officer (1986] 1 NZLR 680). 
10°Chief Judge Durie, 'The Waitangi Tribunal- its relationship with the judicial system", above n60, 
236. Chief Judge Durie illustrates the point as follows: 
Particular claims for the recognition of customary hunting and fishing rights are the sort of 
claims that could be readily transmuted to defined rights by statutory enacanent ... . Such 
rights, if given, would be justiciable .... But many Maori people are really saying much more, 
that their particular view of environmental management should be adopted as a matter of 
national policy. The wider issue is not striclly within the ambit of legal rights but of broad 
policy. (235-6) 
101Gifford emphasises the importance of this task: 
The challenge for the government is to find ways to rerurn in an orderly fashion assets which it 
held in trust for generations, so its treaty parmers can implement the development envisaged by 
rangalira at Waitangi in 1840. It can't do that behind closed doors. Some process of open and 
equitable debate with nga iwi Maori is needed to develop a process which will last. To continue 
lo assume supreme powers in our treaty-driven constitution is to encourage charges of a new 
wave of land grabbing and theft. (A Gifford "Own Goal" (1992) 18 Terra Nova 52.) 
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i Bargaining power 
There is a basic inequality of bargaining power between the Crown and Maori. The 
Crown wields control over the negotiation process: it has skilled and experienced advisors 
and negotiators; and it can, for the most part, pick when and on what terms it wants to 
negotiate, and whether or not to settle. Maori are in a comparatively weak position. They 
have few human and financial resources; they cannot enter into negotiations without a 
measure of political largesse or as a result of judicial favour, and are often unable to walk 
away from a settlement, either because their needs are pressing, or for fear that, without 
settlement, the Crown will act or omit to act so as to prejudice Maori interests. This power 
imbalance can have a significant effect on outcome. There can be no guarantee in such 
circumstances that Maori will regard any settlement reached as legitimate. 
There must, therefore, be mechanisms developed to redress the power imbalance. 
Adequate funding of Maori, in the Waitangi Tribunal and during negotiations, would be 
an important start. 102 More far-reaching possibilities would be the boosting of the couns' 
ability to safeguard the negotiation process and ensure that an imbalance of bargaining 
power was not determinative of outcome. This could be achieved by the statutory 
incorporation of the Treaty103 or of substantive Treaty rights.
104 The appointment of an 
independent body to monitor Treaty negotiations is another possibility. 
105 
102chief Judge Durie commented extra-judicially: 
The key to handling Maori claims, in my view, is how effectively we can suucture the 
negotiation arrangements. Negotiations require that both sides should be evenly armed. It is 
incumbent on the Crown, if it wants a lasting resolution of Maori claims, to ensure that the 
Maori negotiating costs are paid for, and that the claimants are not lacking for professional aid. 
(Chief Judge Durie, speech given at Oxford, 29 November 1989, quoted in (1989) 12 TCL 
46/558; see also "1990 - The Treaty and the Lawyer" Law Talk, Wellington, New Zealand. 
April 1990, vol 324, 28, 33.) 
103 As was proposed in the 1985 draft Bill of Rights: A Bill of RighJs for New 'Zealand: A White
 Paper 
New Zealand. Parliament. House of Representatives. Appendix to the journals, vol I, A6. T
his 
was, however, opposed by Maori: S Jones "The Bill of Rights and Te Tiriti o Waitangi" in A B
ill 
of Rights for New 'Zealand, above n88, 207. It may be, however, that the Maori experience of 
the 
courts after 1987 has changed attitudes. 
104Tbe present trend is to incorporate the Treaty as a roaodarocy relevant consideration for decision-makers
 
(s 8 Resource Management Act 1991), rather than as a substantive limitation on Crown action (
s 9 
SOE Act). This does little to redress the imbalance of bargaining power. 
105Toe Royal Commission on Social Policy recommended the establishment of an independent Tr
eaty of 
Waitangi Commission: Royal Commission on Social Policy The April Repon (Wellingt
on, 
1988)Vol II, 78. This was also recommended for Canada· Task Force to Review Compreberuive 
Claims Policy Living Treaties: Lasting Agreements. Repon of the Task Force to Revi
~w 
Comprehensive Claims Policy (Deparunent of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottaw
a, 
1985) 79-82. 
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ii Representation and ratification 
Negotiation takes place between the Crown and representatives of Maori. Issues arise, 
therefore, with respect to both representation and ratification of Treaty settlements. How 
should the negotiation process respect these concerns? 
First. Maori representatives must be validly appointed by and held accountable to those 
they represent - the hapu, iwi, or, perhaps, all Maori. We have considered the difficulties 
of Maori representation earlier in this paper.106 The Treaty claims process merely re-
inforces the need for the restoration of appropriate uibal strucn.rres. 
Secondly, settlements must be ratified by those whose rights or interests they affecL This 
consent must be genuine and based on an informed understanding of the settlemenL The 
ratification process must also respect the group's internal decision-making structures. For 
Maori:107 
The consensus process requires a high level of community involvement and debate. New ideas 
must be allowed to lie for a long time, and there are inhibitions on all tribal leaders in 
expressing a view that has not been tribally approved. Under the consultative processes of 
Maori, nothing can be hurried along. 
iii Public acceptability 
The Treaty of Waitangi is the basis for a bicultural society, and establishes a place for both 
Maori and Pak:eha. Treaty claims settlements must. therefore, be recognised by the public 
as a legitimate attempt by the Crown to honour the Treaty, for the benefit of all. Building 
public acceptance is an important part of the settlement process. 108 
First, on a practical level, there should be public education campaigns concerning each 
claim, its background, and the principles involved. 1@ There should be forums for public 
106Above Part ll B 2 b. 
107Muriwhenua, 157. 
108see Living Treaties: Lasting Agrurrunts, above n105, 93. 
109ni.is is recognised in theory by the Crown: 
There is an aclmowledgment that these outstanding [Treaty] grievances need to be senled in a 
manner which not only respectS the Crown's obligations, but which is seen to be fair to all 
New Zealanders. (freaty of Waitangi Policy Unit for the Crown Task Force on Treaty of 
Waitangi Issues The Direct Negotiation of Maori Claims (Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit, 
Wellington, 1990).) 
This policy was issued by the Labour Government and continues to be used by the National Government 
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debate and opportunities for public input All must understand the issues and feel that their 
positions have been taken into account 
Secondly, and on a broader level, we must take the time to work though the issues 
involved in Treaty claims resolution. As Chief Judge Durie has emphasised with regard to 
the Waitangi Tribunal:110 
There would seem to be sense in moving slowly in dangerous waters if t.be ship is not to be 
sunk. There has been quite a lot of support for the workings of the Tribunal to date, but it is as 
well to bear in mind that t.be Maori claims dealt with so far have happily harmonised wit.b t.be 
politics of other special interest groups - t.be environmental groups in particular, and those 
opposed to certain industrial developments on economic grounds. What happens when the 
Maori claims are diametrically opposed to the balance of public convenience? 
There must be time for the broader society to work through the structural and attitudinal 
changes which the Treaty requires in 1993. 
3 Overview 
Honouring the Treaty in 1993 requires not only adherence to its substantive principles, but 
also to the requirements of procedural legitimacy. No matter how generous the seulement. 
if it is not also achieved legitimately, then it is not in accordance with the Treaty of 
Waitangi. There must be a commiunent by the Crown and Maori to address these 
outstanding procedural issues as a matter of priority. 
D Conclusion 
The Treaty of W aitangi is the basis for government in New Zealand. It provides core 
principles, substantive and procedural, with which we may redress the breaches of the 
past and honour the Treaty now. Any settlement which contravenes these principles may 
win temporary approval but, in the long run, it may only add to the grievances it sought to 
resolve. We now have the framework with which to consider the legitimacy of the Sealord 
deal. 
l lO,'The Waitangi Tribunal - its relationship with t.be judicial system", above n61, 238. We have seen 
something of this in t.be aftermath of the Waitangi Tribunal's Te Roroa Report Waitangi Tribunal 
Te Roroa Repon (Government Printer, Wellington, 1992) ("Te Roroa"). The Treaty of Waitangi 
Amendment Act 1993, which prevents the Tribunal from making recommendations wit.b respect to 
private land. as it did in Te Roroa, was assented to on 20 August 1993. 
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III TREATY FISHING RIGHTS 
Article II of the Treaty of W aitangi guaranteed to Maori rangatiratanga over their fisheries. 
Maori were thus affirmed in the possession and control of their traditional fisheries, 
subsistence and commercial, and offered something more, a development right in the 
resource. The Crown did not, however, honour its Treaty obligations. We are faced now, 
therefore, with a claim to the fisheries resource and the challenge of upholding the Treaty 
in these new circumstances. 
We consider in this part, first, the Crown's breach of its Treaty obligations and, secondly, 
the recent attempts by the Crown and Maori to senle Treaty claims. 
A Breach of Treaty Fishing Rights 
Treaty fishing rights have been consistently breached by New Zealand's fishing legislation 
and accompanying Crown practice. We look first at legislation before 1986, and secondly, 
at the Quota Management System, introduced in 1986. 
1 Legislation pre-1986 
The Crown has regulated fishing in New Zealand since 1866, and there have been a 
number of different management regimes. 111 All have failed to respect Maori fishing 
rights. 
First, general fishing laws did not recognise the Maori right to participate in the control 
and management of the fisheries. Maori perspectives were never incorporated, and no 
effort was ever made to consult with Maori before legislating.112 
Secondly, general fishing laws did not adequately protect Maori rights to take fish. Maori 
fishing rights were "saved" from the operation of general fisheries legislation, but no 
substantive effect was given to this until 1986.113 The only special provisions that were 
111See Appendix. 
11 2Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries, 295. 
113Tue Maori fishing rights savings provision (s8 Fish Protection Act 1877; s 14 Sea Fisheries 
Amendment Act 1903; s77(2) Fisheries Act 1908; s88(2) Fisheries Act 1983) was given no 
content by the courts for most of its history: the only fishing rights were those given by 
Parliament and the court could not enforce customary rights claimed under aboriginal title or the 
Treaty of Waitangi (Waipapakura v Hempton (1914) 33 NZLR 1065; Inspector of Fisheries v 
Weepu (1956] NZLR 920; Keepa v Inspector of Fisheries (1965) NZLR 322). This approach was 
finally rejected in 1986 in Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer (1986] 1 NZLR 680 where the 
High Court allowed Maori exercising traditional subsistence rights a defence against general 
fisheries laws. The full scope and extent of s88(2), however, was not decided in that case, and there 
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made for Maori fisheries did not fully recognise Maori fishing rights.114 They were 
fundamentally limited by the following assumptions: 11 5 
(i) that Maori imerests should be accommodated by reserving panicular fishing grounds for 
Maori 
(ii) that Maori fishing has no commercial component and grmmds rese.rved must be for personal 
needs 
(iii) that Maori panicipation in the commercial fishing industry should be on no other terms 
than those provided for all citizens 
(iv) that no allowances should be made for Maori fishing methods, gear or rules for resource 
management 
(v) that the recognition of fishing should be an act of state; only parliament should authorise 
the reservation of fishing grounds; there should be no provision for the courts to recognise 
rights on proof of customary entitlement .... 
Maori were thus not included within the development of the national fishing industry.116 
In this way, the Crown breached the Treaty of Waitangi. The Crown had assumed 
sovereignty over the resource with scant regard for Maori rangatiratanga with its rights of 
possession, management and control. This had a fundamental effect on Maori fishing. 117 
Tribes were unable to maintain their extensive subsistence use and control of the fisheries; 
loss of land prevented access to traditional fishing grounds, and those which could be 
reached were often depleted by pollution or through over-fishing. Maori commercial 
fishing went into rapid decline. Tribal resource bases were lost; there was no money to 
develop; and no way to maintain the uibal role in the burgeoning fishing industry. Maori 
were a number of different interpretations in the District Court cases which followed: Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries v Love (1988] OCR 370; Ministry of Agricu/Jure and Fisheries v George 
Campbell and others Unreported. 30 November 1988, District Court, Gisbome CRN 8016004552-
4556; Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries v Pono Hak.aria and Tony Scotl Unreported, 19 May 
1989, District Court, Levin CRN 8031003482-3. The extent to which s88(2) could provide for 
substantive Maori fishing rights was at issue in the Muriwhenua proceedings: below Part ill B 1 a 
and2a 
114Special provisions reserved exclusive fishing grounds for Maori subsistence use (Oyster Fisheries Act 
1892; Maori Councils Act 1900; Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945). Few were 
ever reserved (Muriwhenua,223). There remain. however, some in Northland - 6 oyster reefs in 
Kaipara Harbour, for example - by virtue of the 1986 Fisheries Regulations. Other special 
provisions provide for Maori subsistence needs by permitting the ta.king of shellfish in excess of 
normal limits for tangi or hui, with the approval of a Maori community officer: reg 27 of the 
Fisheries (Amateur Fishing ) Regulations 1986. 
115Muriwhenua, 222. 
1161:be State's support did not extend to iwi. New fishing settlements were fimded, but not existing Macri 
coastal villages (Fisheries Encouragement Act 1885); the loans and incentives that were provided 
for the industry as a whole did not go to tribes: Muriwhenua, 222. 
117See Muriwhenua, 220-224; Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries, 275-282. 
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commercial fishing continued. but only on an individual basis. small-scale. often pan-
time, and thus vulnerable to industry changes which excluded small fishers.118 
2 The Quota Management System 
The Quota Management System("QMS"), established under the Fisheries Amendment Act 
1986, was a revolution in the ownership. management and control of the fisheries 
resource. The Crown's response to the fisheries sustainability crisis119 was to privatise 
the fishery and create a tradeable property interest in an exclusive right of commercial 
fishing. 
The QMS deals with resource ownership in the following way. The Minister of Fisheries 
can declare an area to be a quota management area ("QMA ") and particular species of fish 
in that area to be subject to the QMS.120 The Minister then sets a total allowable catch 
("TAC") for species in the QMA and from that subtracts an allowance for "Maori. 
traditional, recreational. and other non-commercial interests in the fishery" to leave the 
total allowable commercial catch ("TACC").121 The TACC is then divided into individual 
transferable quotas ("ITQ's") which give a pennanent property right to catch and sell a 
certain tonnage of fish. 122 ITQ' s were allocated to existing commercial fishers on the 
basis of previous catch records. 123 Quota holders can trade their property rights or lease 
them to others, and only quota holders can take fish commercially.124 Quota-holders pay 
an annual resource rental to the Crown.125 
Management under the QMS focuses on MAFFish. the fisheries business group within the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries ("MAF"), and the Fishing Industry Board ("FIB"), 
a statutory body with Government and private sector representation. 126 MAFFish handles 
research, administration, management. and advice. 127 The FIB has a broad role in 
industry activity and must be consulted on major fisheries management decisions. 128 
118see Appendix. Between 1984 and 1985, nearly 300 fishers lost their licenses in Ncrthland alooe. The 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries does not keep separate Maori reoords. but the Fairgray Rep<Xt 
estimated that most of these fishers were Maori: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Fisheries 
Management Planning ITQ Implications Study - Second Report (Community Issues) FMP Series 
No 20, 48 ("Fairgray Repon"). 
119See Appendix. 
120section 28B Fisheries Act 1983. 
121 Section 2.SC and 28D Fisheries Act 1983. 
122Section 280 Fisheries Act 1983. 
123Section 28E Fisheries Act 1983. 
124Section 2.SQ and 28ZA Flsheries Act 1983. 
125Section 2.SZC Flsheries Act 1983. 
l26Fishing Industry Board Act 1963. 
127MAFFish is advised by five Fl.shery Management Advisory Committees (FMAC's) who maintain 
relations with fishers at a regional level. Local liaison committees are appointed by MAFFtsh to 
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The QMS has been held to represent a fundamental breach of the Treaty of Waitangi.129 
The Crown had asserted its sovereignty and re-defined the foundations of ownership and 
management of the fisheries resource. It had done so, however, without regard for Maori 
Treaty rights. 
First, the QMS has, at its base, the assumption that no fisheries belong to Maori but all to 
the Crown, and that they are, therefore, the Crown's to give away.130 This is clearly in 
"fundamental conflict with the Treaty's principles and terms, apportioning to non-Maori 
the full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession of the property in fishing that to Maori 
was guaranteed." 131 Further, the Crown's disposal of rights in the fisheries created a 
major obstacle for Maori in obtaining redress for previous Treaty breaches. 
Secondly, the allocation of the Crown-derived rights was prejudicial to Maori: many 
Maori fishers had been driven out of the industry, were part-time only and often did not 
keep accurate catch-records.132 
Thirdly, Maori were given a minimal place only in the management of the commercial 
fishing industry. The only Maori input provided for under the QMS was a discretion to 
include Maori on local advisory committees advising MAFFish, and the reservation of a 
place for Maori on the Fisheries Authority which has functions in relation to fisheries 
management plans.133 
Fourthly, Maori fishing interests are classified by the QMS as traditional and non-
commercial only.134 
provide an input to the FMAC's and comprise representatives from various commercial and 
reaeatiooal fishing groups, environmental groups and Maori organisations: s 7 Fisheries Act 1983. 
128Sections 28B, 28D, 28W, 28ZE, 30, 47, 86 and 107G Fisheries Act 1983. 
129Muriwhenua, 228; Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries, 284-285. 
130Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries, 133. 
131Muriwhenua, xx. Many Maori feel that there is a "fundamental incongruity" between Maori values and 
the QMS: 
They draw uncomfortable parallels with the history of Maori tribal lands where ... conferment of 
individual ownership was a major part of a process of alienation. ITQ's run contrary to the 
concept of communal guardianship (not ownership) of and access to the fish resource ... 
. (Fairgray Repon, above nl 18, 44.) 
132Toe Fairgray Report commented: 
The conferral of ownership at a time where there are very few Maoris fishing commercially is 
seen as effective alienation of the fishery in one move. Many believe this to be contrary to the 
inalienable rigbts of the Maori to the fisheries guaranteed under Article 2 of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. (Above nl198 147.) 
133Section 13 Fisheries Act 1983. 
l34Section 28D Fisheries Act 1983. 
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The Treaty of W aitangi had thus again been breached by the fishing legislation. This time. 
however, the Crown had been warned. The Waitangi Tribunal and the Crown's own 
reports had repeatedly alerted the Crown to its Treaty fishing obligations and their possible 
breach by the new QMS.135 The Crown had, however, continued as before, failing to 
recognise the Treaty as a constitutional limitation on its action, or as giving Maori a place 
in the modern New Z.ealand economy. 
3 Conclusion 
The Treaty of Waitangi's guarantee of fishing rights was thus consistently breached by 
fishing legislation and Crown action. The outcome for Maori was the loss of ownership 
and control of both their subsistence and commercial fisheries. The QMS posed also the 
danger that the Crown's alienation of the fisheries would prevent from ever regaining their 
Treaty fishing rights. Maori thus took action against the QMS in the W aitangi Tribunal and 
the courts. We examine this action and its outcome in the next section. 
B Towards Settlement 
The Crown and Maori grappled, from 1987 to 1993, with the question of how to affirm 
the Treaty fishing right in the circumstances of the late twentieth century. There were two 
main stages in these deliberations: the interim settlement of the Maori Fisheries Act 1989, 
and the full and final settlement of the Treaty of Waitangi (FISheries Claims) Settlement 
Act 1992. We consider these in turn. 
135Toe Waitangi Tribunal had, by 1986, considered Treaty fishing rights in Motonui, Manulcau, and 
Kaituna (Waitangi Tnounal KaiJuna Report (Government Printer, Wellington. I984)("Kaituna"). It 
had also twice warned the Crown in specific memoranda that the QMS should not be put in place 
while Maori fishing rights were still under investigation: below Part ill B 2 a. The Fairgray Repcrt 
had also warned of the grave economic and social consequences of Government fisheries policy for 
Northland communities: above 0118. The Crown's failure to heed these warnings prompted the 
Tribunal to comment thac 
The Ministry was and had been intent on plll'Suing its own plans ... legally if they can. 
otherwise by any means .... It ought to have been obvious, even on a brief reading of the 
Treaty, that the Ministry's proposals stood to be diametrically opposed to the provisions of the 
Treaty. (Muriwhenua.149.) 
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1 Interim settlementl36 
The Maori Fisheries Act 1989 was an interim settlement of Treaty fishing claims imposed 
by the Crown after the Crown and Maori failed to agree. We look. first, to the process 
which led to the interim settlement and. secondly, to its content 
a Process 
Treaty fishing rights were claimed by Maori in the Waitangi Tribunal and in the courts. 
The Waitangi Tribunal claim was made by the Muriwhenua tribes in 1986.137 The 
claimants alleged that the Crown had breached their Treaty fishing rights in legislation and 
Crown practice, particularly under the new QMS. The Waitangi Tribunal released its 
report on the claim on 15 June 1988. The Tribunal found that Maori Treaty rights 
extended to development rights in the commercial fishery, and that the QMS was, as it 
stood, in breach of the Treaty. 
As the Muriwhenua claim was being heard, however, the Crown was continuing with the 
introduction of the QMS. The Crown was warned twice by the Waitangi Tribunal that this 
action was in breach of the Treaty. 138 The Crown ignored the first warning. On the 
second occasion, however, Maori had gone also to court. 
Maori commenced court proceedings on 30 September 1987. They sought judicial review 
of the Minister of Fisheries' decision to allocate quota under the QMS. The action was 
based ons 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 1983, which stated that ''Nothing in this Act shall 
affect any Maori fishing rights." The Maori claimants argued that s88(2) incorporated 
Treaty fishing rights and/or aboriginal title rights and that these rights were affected by the 
QMS in contravention of the section.139 The High Court, on this basis, granted an interim 
136See generally Kelsey A Question of Honour, above n99; G Palmer New Zealand's Constitution in 
Crisis (Wellington, John Mcindoe, 1992 ); A Frame" A State Servant Looks At the Treaty" (1990) 
14 NZULR 82. 
137Toe Muriwhenua claim was the first general fisheries claim. The earlier Motonui, Manulcau, and 
Kaituna reports involved particular Crown practices which had impacted on Maori fisheries. It 
should be noted that the Muriwhenua claim was with respect to both land and fisheries, but 
fisheries were reported on separately and the land claim is still being beard. The second general 
fisheries claim heard was made by Ngai Tahu, and was reported in 1992 as Ngai Tahu Sea 
Fisheries, after the lands claim. Ngai Tahu, in 1991. 
138Toe first Waitangi Tribunal memorandum, concerning the initial allocation of quota under the QMS, 
was issued on 8 December 1986. The secood memorandum concerned the Government's proposal to 
bring more species under the QMS, and was issued on 30 September 1987. These memoranda are 
reproduced in Muriwhenua, 289-297. 
139Tois substantive use of s88(2) was, therefore, an extension from Te Wuhi, above n, which bad 
affirmed s88(2) as a defence to proceedings brought under the Fisheries Act 1983. The extension 
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declaration that the Crown ought not to proceed with allocations of those s
pecies in 
Muriwhenua, 140 and later, in all of New Zealand.
141 
The Crown was thus forced, therefore, to negotiate with Maori.
142 On 25 November 
1987, a Joint Working Group, comprising four Crown and four Maori rep
resenca.tives, 
was established to determine how to honour the Maori fishing claims.
143 It was to reach a 
negotiated settlement before 30 June 1988 when the claims were to be hea
rd. 144 By 30 
June. however, there had been no agreement. The Crown and Maori had v
ery different 
perceptions of the Treaty's requirements.1
4s 
The Maori negotiators claimed that Maori were entitled under the Treaty o
f W aitangi to 
l 00 per cent of the fisheries. 146 Maori were prepared, however, to accept the Q
MS and 
share ownership and management under it equally with the Crown. The C
rown 
negotiators proposed another model altogether. They recognised that the T
reaty of 
Waitangi entitled Maori to ownership and control rights in the commercial
 fishing 
resource, but proposed that all ITQ's revert to a corporation which would contro
l and 
manage the fishery. The corporation would lease out its quota by tender, w
ith annual 
was accepted by the High Court and the Court of Appeal for the pur
pose of granting interim 
declarations. There remained issues, however, as to the scope of s88(2
), the source of the rights 
referred to, their content, and whether, after the passing of the Maori Fish
eries Act discussed in this 
part, they had been satisfied. 
140New Zealand Maori Council and Te Runanga o Muriwhenua v AJromey-Gener
ai and Minister of 
Fisheries Unreported, 30 September 1987, High Court Wellington Regis
try CP 553/87. Greig J 
found that "What has been done and what will be done in the continuation
 of the quota 
management system is, in my view, contrary to the Act in that it will aff
ect the Maori fishing 
right." 
14 1Toe Crown's response to the Muriwhenua declaration was to gazette all remaining 
areas. The Ngai 
Tahu Maori Trust Board and others representing most of the coastal tri
bes of New Zealand then 
brought another judicial review action and asked for the existing declara
tion to be extended: Ngai 
Tahu Maori Trust Board and ors v AJtomey-GeneraJ and Minister of Agr
icuilure and Fisheries and 
ors Unreported, 12 November 1987, High Court Wellington Registry CP
 559/87, 610/87, 614/87. 
These two review applications comprise the "first bracket proceedings". 
142Toe interim declarations remained in force but the parties negotiated the continuanc
e of QMS on a 
temporary basis. 
143Toe Maori negotiators were those who had represented Maori in the first bracket pro
ceedings: Matiu 
Rat.a from Muriwhenua; Tipene O'Regan from Ngai Tahu; Sir Graha
m Latimer for the New 
Zealand Maori Council; and Denese Henare on behalf of Tainui. These negoti
ators were mandated at 
a national hui in 1988 to seek a settlement of not less than 50 per cent of the f
isheries. Maori were 
given $1.5 million ex gratia by the Crown by way of payments to re
imburse claims for costs 
incurred in the negotiations. This did not cover all costs and additional
 funding was evenrually 
provided by the Maori Fisheries Commission: Repon of the Maori Fish
eries Commission for the 
eighleen month period ended 30 September,1992 New Zealand. H
ouse of Representatives. 
Appendix to the journals, 1993 Cl 9: 23. 
14-4rrbe interim declarations remained in force but the continuance of the Q
MS on a temporary basis was 
negotiated. 
145Toe Crown and Maori Working Group's Reports are reproduced as an appendix to the L
aw 
Commission's Report:The Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Fisheries, above
 034. 
146This view is not in accordance with the Waitangi Tribunal's findings in Muriwhenu
a and, later. Ngai 
Tahu Sea Fisheries. This was emphasised in Fisheries Sett/emenr, 10. 
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resource rentals raised to the market maximum in five years. Maori would have a major 
share in management. with Maori and the Crown each having three directors and with the 
Crown appointing an additional chairperson. Maori would also share significantly in the 
benefits from the resource, with shares in the corporation allocated 25 per cent to Maori 
and 75 per cent to the Crown. 147 Maori would not, however, be allocated quota under the 
settlement. 148 
Negotiations continued thereafter on a Cabinet level, but without success. The 
Government decided as a result to legislate for settlement, without Maori consent The 
Maori Fisheries Bill, providing for the effective extinguishment of Maori fishing rights, 
was introduced in September 1988. 149 Maori went straight back to court. Actions were 
brought on behalf of virtually all fishing tribes alleging trespass, breach of fiduciary duty 
and negligence, 150 and the Crown was forced back into negotiations.151 No agreement 
was reached, but there was a measure of general approval to an interim settlement l52 A 
Crown submission was, therefore, given to the Select Committee considering the original 
Maori Fisheries Bill and it was incorporated, with some changes. The Maori Fisheries Act 
was passed on 20 December 1989 as an interim solution to Maori Treaty fishing 
claims.153 
The High Court declarations and the interim arrangements with respect to the QMS 
remained in force, however, and the substantive proceedings to determine the extent of 
147Toe 25 per cem figure was calculated on the basis thal Maori bad Trealy rights lo 100 per cent of the 
inshore fishery and 12.5 per cem of lhe deep sea fishery (based on population). Four per cem of this 
tot.a.I was subtracted, 2 per cent in order lo provide quola for Maori fishers excluded in the early 
1980's, and 2 per cem for training Maori in the fishing industry. 
148 Apan from the 4 per cenl of quota mentioned above nl48. This was intended lo deflect the conflict of 
interesl which would be raised if Maori were to be both managers and users of the fishing resource . 
Maori could. of course, buy quota for themselves. 
149Tue Bill provided for Maori to be given up to 50 per cent quola over the next 20 years, bul was 
dependent on the quota being "subslantially fished" by Maori. In return, s88(2) would be repealed, 
the jurisdiction of the courts would be ousted, and Maori would be unable to go to the Wailallgi 
Tribunal for 20 years. 
15°'Toese are the second bracket proceedings, filed as Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v Attorney-General 
Wellington, CP 743/88. 
151 he compulsion, this time, was political. The Crown could have passed the Maori Fisheries Bill and 
ousted the jurisdiction of the courts. The Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Palmer, saw this, however, 
as "unconstitutional": Palmer, above nl36, 95 . 
152Tue press slalement of the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Palmer, of 28 October 1988 recorded a measure 
of suppon from both the Maori representatives and from the fishing industry: Frame, above n 136, 
n27. 
153"The Act does not use the word "interim", but in leaving s88(2) and the High Court proceedings in 
existence, and imposing no bar on Waitangi Tribunal proceedings, Parliament has clearly left it to 
the courts and the Tribunal to determine bow far the Act goes in discharge of any obligations 
falling on the Crown: Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v Attomey-Genuai [1990] 2 NZLR 641, 649 
(''Te Ruflllllga o Muriwhenua (CA)") . 
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Maori Treaty and aboriginal fishing rights were set down for hearing in early 1990.154 
On 27 February 1990, the Crown and Maori reached an agreement that all substantive 
proceedings should stand adjourned sine die, and Maori agreed not to return to court 
before October 1992. 155 The Crown promised that no further species would be brought 
within the QMS without agreement or court resolution. Fishing continued, under these 
arrangements, largely unrestricted. 
b Content 
The Maori Fisheries Act 1989 recognises the Treaty of Waitangi as entitling Maori to a full 
set of rights in the modern fishing resource. The Act states its purpose as being: 
(a) To make better provision for the recognition of Maori fishing rights guaranteed under the 
Treaty of Waitangi; and 
(b) To facilitate the enlry of Maori into. and the development by Maori of, the business and 
activity of fishing .... 
The Act provides for both commercial and traditional subsistence fishing rights. These are 
considered in turn below. 
i Commercial fishing rights 
The Maori Fisheries Act recognises Treaty commercial fishing rights within the 
framework of the QMS. The Act gives Maori 10 per cent of existing quota 156 and a $10 
million grant towards the establishment of Maori commercial fisheries. 157 It also sets up 
an institutional structure to deal with these Maori assets, the Maori Fisheries 
Commission 158 and Aotearoa Fisheries Limited.159 
154Toere were a number of procedural cases in the High Court and the Court of Appeal in early 1990 
relating to hearing dates, adjournments, the continuance of the interim declarations. and evidential 
matters. In one case, the Court of Appeal indicated that the issue under s88(2) may be "whether the 
provisions of the Maori Fisheries Act 1989 are a sufficient ttanslation or expression of traditional 
Maori fishing rights in present-day circumstances." As an interim measure, the court opined that 
the Act was probably sufficient Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v Attorney-General (CA), above 
n153, 656. 
155Proceed.ings were, however, to resume at the end of that month if a settlement could not be made: Te 
Reo o Te Tini a Tangaroa, newsletter of the Maori Fisheries Commission, Special Report from the 
1992 AGM of the Maori Fisheries Commission, July 1992, 2 (''Tangaroa"). 
l56Se<:tion 40 Maori Fisheries Act 1989. 
157Se<:tion 45 Maori Fisheries Act 1989. 
158Se<:tion 4 Maori Fisheries Act 1989. 
159Section 12 Maori Fisheries Act 1989. 
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The Maori Fisheries Commission holds 50 per cent of the settlement assets. Its purpose is 
to facilitate Maori entry into the business and activity of fishing. 160 The Crown envisaged 
the Commission as a continuing institution which would provide Maori fishers with 
technical and financial assistance on the basis not only of custom but also on broader 
social and economic considerations. 161 The Commission, however, defined its own role 
more tightly. It saw itself as a temporary body whose primary responsibility was to 
allocate the settlement assets to iwi. 162 That was not possible under the Act until 1992. In 
the meantime, the Commission would seek to optimise the benefits of the quota for 
iwi, 163 and to prepare iwi through development and training programmes to receive the 
resource. 164 The Commission would also consult with iwi to establish the principles of 
allocation. The Commission favoured the "mana moana mana whenua" model, under 
which each tribe is deemed to possess the whole of the fishery from their coastlines to the 
end of the EEZ, with allocations to be based on the relative catch values in the 
consequentially defined sea territories. 165 1nis it saw as in accordance with tikanga 
Maori 166 and the Waitangi Tribunal's findings ,167 and it leased quota to tribes on this 
basis. 168 The principles of allocation were, however, never finally determined. 169 
160Section 5 Maori Fisheries Act 1989. 
161Section 8 Maori Fisheries Act 1989. 
162Toe Hon R Prebble, MP, Minister of State-Owned Enterprises and a chief fisheries negotiator under 
the Labour Government. emphasised the conflict between this conception and the Crown' s 
intentions: 
[nhe Maori Fisheries Commission, which was set up by a Labour Government.. was not set 
up to distribute Maori fisheries rights; the commission was set up to help Maori to go 
fishing, but it has been subverted . ... That body was not set up to be a judicial body deciding 
who is to get what propeny rights. (New Zealand Parliamentary Debates. Vo! 532, 1992: 
12833.) 
Given that the settlement was imposed on Maori, its "subversion" in practice is unsurprising. 
163Toe Commission's quota was, therefore, leased by tender but with a preference for lease to Maori . 
Almost all of the quota was leased to Iwi organisations and individual Maori: Repon of rhe Mann 
Fisheries Commission, above n 143, 6. 
164 Repon of rhe Maori Fisheries Commission . above n 143 . 
!65 Fisheries Settlement, 18. 
166"'The Commission thinks that tikanga Maori , the customs and rules that govern Maori. should be the 
basis of sharing quota to the tribes .... Thus as mana whenua applies to land, mana moana applies 
to the sea. The Commission is of the view that the fi sh in the sea off an iwi's coast is that iwi's 
fish": Tangaroa, Special Issue for 1992 AGM of the Maori Fisheries Commission. July 1992, 2. 
167 Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries "is clearly supportive of the kaupapa adopted by the Commission tying quota 
allocation to 'mana whenua mana moana'": Tangaroa, Special Report from the 1992 AGM of the 
Maori Fisheries Commission, August 1992, 3. 
168H Barlow "More talks likely on Maori fish quotas" The Dominion, Wellington, 28 August 1992, 2. 
169Toe 1992 Hui-a-Tau of the Commission resolved "that MFC examine the alternative methods to 
allocate, consult with iwi, and have prepared discussion material to enable agreement to be reached 
on the optimum method for allocation": Schedule IA, Maori Fisheries Act 1989, as amended bys 
18 Settlement Acl The question of the allocation of these assets is still current as the Settlement 
Act is careful to distinguish between these, the ''pre-settlement assets", and the ''post-settlement 
assets" of the Sealord deal: s 6(e)(l) and s 9(2)(1) Maori Fisheries Act 1989, as amended by the 
Settlement AcL The new Commission, the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission (below Pan 
III B 2 b), is focussing first on the allocation of pre-settlement assets. It is expected that the 
principles of allocation will be similar for both: Treaty of Wairangi Fisheries Commission Hui-a-
Tau, Pipitea Marae, 31 July 1993, materials presented. 18-20. 
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Aotearoa Fisheries Limited, a wholly owned public company, was required by the Act to 
be formed as the commercial arm of the Commission and to hold 50 per cent of the 
Commission's assets. 170 AFL was required to seek a commercially driven return in order 
to provide a capital base for Maori. 
ii Traditional fishing rights 
The Maori Fisheries Act established the taiapure-local fisheries model in order "to make 
better provision for the recognition of rangatiratanga and of the right secured in relation to 
fisheries by Article II of the Treaty ofWaitangi."171 
The Act defines the taiapure as a coastal fishing area limited to littoral or estuarine waters 
which is of special significance to the local iwi either for fishing or for cultural or spiritual 
reasons. 172 The purpose of the taiapure is to give local Maori a greater say in the 
management and conservation of the area. It is not to establish a special fishing regime for 
iwi, and the taiapure regulations may not discriminate against people on the grounds of 
"colour, race, ethnic or national origins." 173 
The Minister of Fisheries approves the establishment of a taiapure after an extensive 
application and objection process,174 and appoints the taiapure's committee of 
management on the recommendation of the local Maori community.175 The committee 
advises the Minister on the making of regulations for the conservation and management of 
the area, but has no substantive powers itself. 
The provisions of the Fisheries Act affecting traditional subsistence fishing rights, s88(2) 
and the Amateur Fishing Regulations, continue. 
170Sections 12 and 43 Maori Fisheries Act 1989. In practice, the Commission transferred all t.be deep sea 
quota LO Aotearoa Fisheries: Tangaroa, Issue 7, November 1991, 12. 
171 Section 54A Fisheries Act 1983, as inserted bys 74 Maori Fisheries Act 1989. 
172Section 54A Fisheries Act 1983. 
173Section 54K(6) Fisheries Act 1983. 
1741oe process involves the submission of a detailed proposal for the taiapure; its initial approval by the 
Minister, the publication of the notice in the Gazelle and metropolitian newspapers; the lodging of 
copies of the proposal in a number of specified locations; the hearing of objections and 
submissions by a Tribunal consisting of a Judge of the Maori Land Court. assisted, if necessary, 
by assessors appointed by the Chief Judge; a report to the Minister, the Minister's decision and its 
publication in the gazette: ss 54B - 54I Fisheries Act 1983. 
175Section 541 Fisheries Act 1983. 
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c Conclusion 
The Maori Fisheries Act marked a significant first step in Treaty claims resolution. It 
recognised, for the first time, the Treaty of W aitangi as entitling Maori to a full set of 
rights in the modern fishing resource; and affirmed direct negotiation as the preferred 
settlement process. although not successful at this point The settlement represented, 
however, only the Crown's perspective on how to respect the Treaty fishing right The 
settlement could thus not have legitimacy as a solution in itself. It paved the way, 
however, for the final settlement of Treaty fishing claims in the Sealord deal. 
2 Full and final settlementl 76 
The Sealord deal is a full and final settlement of all Maori Treaty fishing claims. It claims 
to honour the Treaty in 1993 and to take Maori beyond "grievance mode" to "development 
mode". We consider in this section first, the process towards the Sealord deal, and, 
secondly, its content. 
a Process 
The Maori Fisheries Act was a temporary solution only. The Crown may have hoped that 
Treaty fishing claims were over - both Labour and National had made it clear at the 1990 
election that the Maori Fisheries Act was seen by the Crown as the end of the mauer177 -
but Maori were intent on reaching a full settlement 
The Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Repon, released on 11 August 1992, gave suppon to the 
Maori position. The W aitangi Tribunal affirmed N gai Tahu' s exclusive inshore fishing 
and deep sea development rights, and saw the Maori Fisheries Act as a panial solution 
only. 178 Further, the interim declarations were still in force 179 and the possibility of 
returning to court was open. 180 There was, however, no new agreement in sight. 
176see generally Kelsey, Rolling Back the State, above n48, 260-269; PG McHugh "Sealords and Sharks: 
The Maori Fisheries Agreement (1992)" [1992] NZI.J 354; Fisheries Seulement. The preamble to 
lhe Settlement Act also provides a useful summary of events. 
177Kelsey, Rolling Back the Stale, above n49, 261. 
118Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries, 287-288. 
179Despite the Crown's attempt in 1990 to have them lifted. In Te Runanga o Muriwhenua v Attomey-
General Unreported, 28 June 1990, Court of Appeal CA 110/90, the Court of Appeal allowed an 
appeal from a High Court decision to rescind the interim orders. 
180nie Crown-Maori agreement in 1990 was that proc.eedings could be resumed at the end of October 
1992 if no settlement had been reached: above nl55. Neither the Crown nor Maori, however, 
wanted to resolve the Treaty fishing claims through litigation. The legal issues, despite obiter 
comment from the Court of Appeal, were still wide open, and the amount of factual material needed 
to establish, and refute, the existence of Maori fishing rights was immense, especially as tbe 
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The opportunity to settle the Treaty fishing claim came in
 mid-1992. Sealord Fisheries 
Limited, one of New Zealand's largest fishing companies
 with 26 per cent of existing 
quota. was put up for tender. 1
81 Maori saw a real chance to re-enter the New Zealand 
fishing industry as a major player. Maori also recognised
 that Sealord was critical to the 
settlement of their Treaty fishing claims. If the company
's quota had gone elsewhere, the 
Crown may never have been able to fulfil its Treaty oblig
ations. The Crown 's ability to 
buy back quota on the open market was limited by the inc
reasing expense and the 
opposition of the fishing industry to purchases from exis
ting companies. Further, there 
was a limit to the financial and personal resources of the 
negotiators, and pressure, after 
six years of on-and-off litigation and negotiation, to start
 doing something practical about 
Maori needs now. There were also limited options open t
o Maori for resolving the claim. 
Maori may have been in court, but they were conscious o
f the difficulties of both proving 
their case and achieving an appropriate remedy. Further, 
Maori felt that if they did not take 
up the Sealord opportunity on the terms offered, the Crow
n would lose all interest in 
settling Treaty claims. 182 The Crown, on its pan. saw the
 opportunity to finally end 
claims, quantify its liability, and achieve a politically acce
ptable settlement 
The Maori negotiators asked the Crown to help them to b
uy into Sealord in late August 
1992. There followed several days of intense negotiation
s, in secret, under considerations 
of strict confidentiality, and driven by a tight commercial
 deadline. On 27 August 1992, 
the Crown and the Maori negotiators signed a Memorand
um of Understanding, an 
agreement in principle subject to ratification by 24 Septem
ber 1992. 
Maori interests had thus far been represented by the Mao
ri negotiators. 183 These people 
had been given a mandate by the Maori Fisheries Commi
ssion's Hui- a-Tau in July 1992 
to represent iwi in negotiations with the Crown. There ha
d been, however, no discussion 
Waitangi Tribunal's reports had been ruled not conclusiv
e evidence of their exist.ence: Te Runanga 
o Muriwhenua (CA), above nl53, 654. 
181 Sealord Fisheries Limited was owned by Carter Holl 
Harvey. Carter Holl had. however, run into 
difficulties when an increase in its overseas shareholdin
g had put it in breach of the Fisheries Act 
limits for foreign ownership of quota. The Minister of Fi
sheries undertook not LO enforce forfeiture 
provisions against Carter Holt., provided Sealord was flo
ated immediately. The Minist.er's decision 
was upheld in the Court of Appeal: Southern Ocean Traw
lers Ltd v Director-Genera/ of Fisheries 
(1993] 2 NZLR 53. 
182Toese factors in the negotiators' decision to settle are g
iven by Mr O'Regan: Treaty of Waitangi 
Fisheries Commission Hui-a-Tau , above nl69, 4. 
183Tbe Maori negotiators were those who had represente
d Maori in the interim settlement They were 
Matiu Rata. Sir Graham Latimer, Robert Te Kotahi
 Mahuta, Tipene O'Regan, Whatarangi 
Winiata. Richard Dargaville. Cletus Manu Paul, and Dav
id Higgins: s2 Settlement Act. 
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of any imminent settlement. nor of one along the Sealord line.
184 The Memorandum of 
Understanding was as much a surprise to Maori as it was to the general p
ublic. 
Ratification of the Memorandum of Understanding raised additional prob
lems. There was 
no pan-Maori body capable of giving its consent to the deal. and no clear me
ans of 
identifying iwi or hapu authorities with the authority to approve the senle
ment The Crown 
and the Maori negotiators decided. therefore. to take the deal to national h
ui and some 23 
marae throughout the country for ratification. 
Many allegations have been made concerning these hui.
185 Their overriding theme is that 
there was no informed or sufficient consent for the Sealord deal. Maori, i
t is claimed. did 
not understand the full content and implications of the memorandum; ther
e was no time for 
proper consideration; full and frank disclosures were not always made - s
ome negotiators 
would not reveal the contents of the Memorandum on the grounds of com
mercial 
sensitivity; iwi were not assisted by lawyers or financial advisors; and no 
negative aspects 
of the deal were ever presented. Further, it is alleged, there was much co
nfusion as to the 
deal' s effect on traditional fishing rights and no support for any abrogatio
n of Treaty 
rights.186 
There was, however, sufficient support on the face of the record of the hu
i submitted by 
the Maori negotiators for the Crown to conclude that Maori had given a su
fficient 
mandate. 187 The Crown decided to proceed to the conclusion of a formal
 deed. 
The Deed of Settlement was entered into between the Crown and represen
tatives of many, 
but not all, iwi 188 and Maori organisations with fishing interests at Parlia
ment on 23 
September 1992. The Deed received tri-partisan commendation in Parliam
ent the 
following day. 189 The Crown and the Maori signatories agreed that the se
ttlement was not 
184Toe Hui-A-Tau would seem rather to have envisaged the continuation of negotiations
 directed towards 
achieving the retwn of 50 per cent of the fishing resource. The Hui had 
resolved: "That MFC 
ensure that no allocation of the 10 per cent be made before the position of t
he pursuit of the legal 
rights of iwi to secure the complete 50 per cent is secure." (Schedule lA Mao
ri Fisheries Act 1989, 
as inserted bys 18 Settlement Act.) 
185See generally Fisheries Senlement, 15-17; Kelsey Rolling Back the State, above n49
, 264-267; John 
Kaiwai "Maoridom 'sat in ignorance' over Sealord" Dominion, Wellington, 1
4 October 1992, 10. 
l86Fisheries Settlement, 15. 
187Toe Waitangi Tribunal found that "in the lights of the report emanating from the hui i
t was reasonable 
for the Crown to believe it was justified in proceeding": Fisheries Settlement, 16. 
188Dissenting iwi included NgaLi Porou, Ngati Awa. Tuburu, Whanau-a-Apanui. Ngati 
Kahungunu, Tai 
Tokerau, Te Runanga O Wharekauri Rekohu, Nga Puhl, and Ngati Toa 
189New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vo! 529, 1992: 11214 - 11235. 
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binding on those who did not sign; 190 but all were to be drawn in under the deed's 
enacting legislation. 
The Sealord deal was, at this point, challenged by the dissenting iwi before the couns and 
the W aitangi Tribunal. In the courts, the application for interim relief by way of injunction 
or declaration was declined. 191 The Court of Appeal found that it could not interfere in 
Parliamentary proceedings; 192 the wisdom of the senlement and the sufficiency of its 
mandate were "political questions for political judgmenL"193 The Court of Appeal 
commented. however, that the Sealord deal was "a responsible and major step 
forward": 194 
If there are shortcomings in the drafting of the Deed, and it might possibly turn out in the long 
term not to satisfy all understandable Maori aspirations, it is nevenheless an historic step. The 
Sealord opportunity was a tide that had to be taken at the flood. A failure to do so might well 
have been inconsistent with the constructive performance of the duty of a party in a position 
akin to parmership. 
The Waitangi Tribunal also upheld the Sealord deal. It did so, however, subject to a 
number of substantive amendments, particularly with regard to the extinguishing of rights 
and the ability to judicially review traditional fisheries regulations. 195 None of these were 
made.196 
The Sealord deal was challenged also on the international level. Dr Tamati Reedy 
condemned it before the United Nations General Assembly at the launch of the UN 
International Year for the World's Indigenous Peoples, and a complaint on behalf of 12 
iwi was filed with the United Nations Human Rights Commiuee.
197 
190Te Runanga O Wharekauri, above n9, 307. 
19 1Te Runanga O Wharekauri Rekolw /ncorpora1ed v Attorney-General (1993] 2 NZLR 301. 
192cooke P's judgment had, however, a "twist in its tail." Whilst declining this application, he added that 
the proper time for challenge, if there were any relevant limitations on legislation, was after the 
deed's enactmenL (308) As Kelsey comments, "[w]hat Cooke [P] left unsaid was how expansive 
such a challenge could be, based on what grounds, and bow far a court might go to strike it down." 
(Kelsey, Rolling Back the State, above n49, 219.) An opening has thus been left. 
193Te Runanga O Wharekauri, above nl91, 309. 
194Te Runanga O Wharekauri, above nl91, 306-307. 
195 Fisheries Settlement, 23-4. 
196 At a meeting called by the National Maori Congress shortly afte.r tbe Waitangi Tribunal's decision. the 
Tribunal's findings seemed to be the basis for consensus amongst Maori after momhs of division. 
The Crown was, however, not interested: A Robb "Who are the Sea Lords now?" Mana, Issue 2, 
March-April 1993, 27. 
197"'Historif Sealord bill finally becomes law" Dominion 11 December 1992, 1, 2; "UN told of Maori 
opPo/tion to Sealord deal" Dominion. 12 December 1992, 1. '::> 
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The Treaty of W aitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Ac
t 1992. enacting the deal. was 
passed under urgency on 10 December 1992.19
8 It was opposed by all Maori MP's, 
Labour and National, and the Labour Opposition, but sup
poned by the Alliance and the 
National Government. 
b Content 
The Sealord deal provides for Maori involvement in comm
ercial fishing and fisheries 
management, and establishes a new traditional fisheries r
egime. We consider these aspects 
of the deal in turn. 
i Commercial fishing rights 
The Sealord deal gives Maori a half share in Sealord Fish
eries Limited 199 and 20 percent 
of any new fishing quora,200 in addition to the 10 percen
t of existing quota and $1 O 
million transferred under the Maori Fisheries Act The Se
alord deal restores Maori to a 
position as major players in the New Zealand fishing indu
stry and transfers a total benefit 
estimated at $0.5 billion. 201 
The settlement assets are held by the Treaty of Waitangi 
Fisheries Commission, the newly 
constituted Maori Fisheries Commission.
202 The Commission is responsible for the 
allocation of the assets to iwi. Tius is to be done in two s
tages. First, the Maori Fisheries 
Act assets are to be allocated in accordance with the resol
utions of the 1992 Hui-a-Tau, 
and, secondly, the Sealord assets are to be allocated in ac
cordance with the principles of 
198The Minister of Justice justified the urgency as follows: 
This bill will not go to a select committee for the ve
ry real reason that it would be hard to 
suggest that this matter has not been the subject of co
nsultation - endlessly - with Maori and 
with everybody else. (New Zealand Parliamentary Deba
tes Vol 532, 1992: 12823.) 
199Sealord Fisheries Limited was bid for successfully by a Maori/ Brie
rley Invesanent Limited ("BIL") 
Joint Venture. The Deed of Settlement required that the
 Joint Ventme agreement give Maori a first 
option on BIL's share: cl 2.1.3.6. The Crown contribu
ted Sl50 million towards the Maori share: 
s 7 Settlement Act. 
200Clause 3.2, Deed of Settlement. The Sealord deal's disc
ontinuance of the Maori coun proceedings (s 11 
Settlement Act) allows the Minister of Fisheries to bri
ng new species under the QMS. The value 
of new fishing quota is expected to rise rapidly as the specie
s are developed: Minister of F1Sheries, 
New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vo! 532, 1992: 
12817. Legislation amending the Fisheries 
Act to provide for the 20 per cent allocation to Maori ha
s yet to be passed. 
201 Above n5. 
202 section 4(1) Maori Fisheries Act 1989, as amend
ed by s 14 Settlement Act. There are 13 
commissioners, appointed by the Crown after consulta
tion with Maori: s 29 Maori Fisheries Act, 
as amended by s 16 Settlement Act. Appoinanent to
ok place in June 1993 and was a highly 
politicised process about which there was much discon
tent. Proceedings seeking judicial review of 
the Minister's decision were lodged but withdrawn: "
Tribes decide against legal challenge" The 
Evening Post, Wellington, 2 June 1993, 21. Aotearoa F
isheries Limited is to be wound up and its 
assets transferred to the Commission for distributio
n to iwi: Treary of Waitangi Fisheries 
Commission Hui-a-Tau, above nl69, 13-14. 
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the Treaty of W aitangi and according to a procedure determined by the Co
mmission after 
full consultation with iwi.203 In practice, however, the Commission face
s the same issues 
with respect to both allocations. The 1992 Hui-A-Tau resolved only that t
he Commission 
examine alternative methods of allocation, seemingly leaving the issue wi
de open. 
There is, however, considerable disagreement amongst iwi as to these allo
cation 
principles. Two main issues arise: when should assets be allocated to trib
es, and on what 
basis? The mostly Southern tribes204
 emphasise property rights and favour the immediate 
allocation of assets to iwi on the mana moana model.
205 On this basis, Ngai Tahu would 
receive 75 per cent of the resource for its 20 OOO people; Nga Puhi, with a
 few kilometres 
of coastline and 75 OOO people, would receive virtually nothing.
206 The Northern tribes 
favour a base principle of "equitable development."
207 They seek to delay the allocation of 
quota in order to develop the Maori holding as a whole, rather than in une
conomic 
fragments, and to allow iwi more time to develop their commercial bases.
 The Northern 
tribes want eventual allocation to be on the basis of tribal population. 
There is an immediate need to resolve these allocation principles in order t
o enable the 
leasing of quota for the new fishing season.
208 The tribes had not, however, been able to 
reach a compromise and the decision was left to the Treaty of Waitangi Fi
sheries 
Commission. The Commission has reached a compromise solution for th
e purposes of 
this quota round, but has stressed that it should not be seen as a precedent
 for allocation of 
the resource. 209 
The Sealord deal represents a full and final settlement of all Maori comme
rcial fishing 
claims. whether based on the Treaty of W aitangi or aboriginal title. In retu
rn for the 
benefits of the deal, Maori accept that all Treaty and aboriginal title claims
 against the 
203Toe first allocation may proceed after a report by the Commission to lh
e Minister (s 9(2) Maori 
Fisheries Act, as amended by s 17 Settlement Act), lhe second only after th
e incorporation of lhe 
procedure in a new Maori Fisheries Act (s6(e) Maori Fisheries Act, as amend
ed bys 15 Settlement 
Act). Toe Deed of Settlement provides that an iwi may request that the C
rown recommend lo 
Parliament that this Maori Fisheries Bill be referred to the Waitangi Tribu
nal under s 8 of the 
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 and that lhe Crown shall so recommend: cl 4.5.3
. 
204Ngai Tahu and Te Runanga O Wbarekauri Rekohu, from the South Island, a
nd also Ngati Kahungunu 
and N gati Porou form the North. 
205"Sharing om the fish", above n5. 
206R Laugesen "Party's over for Bolger as tempers gel frayed" The Dominion, We
llington, 15 February 
1993, 2. 
207Toe Northern consortium comprises Tai Tokerau, Tainui, Te Arawa, an
d Mataalua and claim to 
represent more than 60 per cent of Maoridom: "Sharing oul the fish", above n
5. 
208 The season opens on 1 October 1993: E O'Leary "Maori keen to settle fis
h dispute" The Evening 
Post , Wellington, 2 August 1992, 3. Toe quota to be leased involves, for t
he first time, deep sea 
fishing quota, previously held by AFL: ''More talks likely on Maori fishing qu
ota" above nl68. 
209s Ra.ea "Compromise reached in Maori fishing quota row" The Dominion, Wellington, 1 September 
1993, 3. As at 1 September 1993, the Commission has not released deails of l
he compromise. 
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Crown "(current and future) in respect of, or directly 
or indirectly based on, rights and 
interests of Maori in commercial fishing are hereby fully a
nd finally settled, satisfied, and 
discharged."210 The Courts and the Waitangi T
ribunal have no further jurisdiction to hear 
commercial fishing claims;
211 s 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 1983 is repealed;212 and
 the 
Maori court proceedings are statutorily discont
inued. 213 Treaty commercial fishing rights 
are thus effectively abrogated.
214 Maori have also recognised that the fisheries s
ettlement 
will limit the Crown's ability to settle other Tre
aty claims. 215 
ii Fisheries management 
The Sealord deal provides a new role for Maor
i in fisheries managemenL Maori are to 
have two places on the Fishing Industry Board
, and all advisory committees appointed by 
the Board are to have a Maori representative.21
6 
The Treaty of W aitangi Fisheries Commission must also
 be consulted by the Crown at the 
same time as the Fisheries Act requires it to consult with t
he Fishing Industry Board.
217 
Consultation is required, for example, on the in
troduction of species to the QMS, the 
determination of the T ACC, the declaration of
 a controlled fishery or a closed season, and 
210section 9 Settlement AcL 
211 Section 9(b) Settlement Act; s6(7) Treaty of Wait.angi 
Act 1975, as amended by s40 Settlement Act. 
212Section 33 Settlement Act. 
213Section 11 Settlement Act. 
214The Memorandum of Understanding and the Deed o
f Settlement required Maori agreement to the 
"extinguishment" of Treaty and aboriginal rights. R
eference to extinguishment was, however, 
omitted from the Settlement Act after Maori pressure.
 This would appear, however, to have no real 
effect. If a right imposes no obligations and cannot be
 enforced. then, for all practical purposes, it 
is abrogated: "the just rights of peoples are ... meanin
gless without access to the couns to enforce 
lhem." (Fisheries Settlement, 22.) The Crown and th
e Maori negotiators have, however, skirted 
this conclusion: "We are not giving up our Treaty 
rights. We are accepting that, in respect of 
commercial sea fisheries, lhey will have been honou
red" (The Sealord Deal - What it means for 
Maori, above nlO); "The end result is that Treaty ri
ghts remain unaffected" (Mr Graham, New 
Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vo! 532, 1992: 12929-
12930). 
215Clause 4.6 of the Deed of Settlement provides: 
Maori recognise that the Crown has fiscal constraints 
and that this settlement will necessarily 
restrict the Crown's ability to meet from any fund w
hich the Crown establishes as pan of lhe 
Crown· s overall settlement framework, the settlement
 of other claims arising from lhe Treaty of 
Waitangi. 
216Sections 3(3) and 9 Fishing Industry Board Act 1963, 
as amended by ss 42 and 43 Settlement Act. The 
Fishing Industry Board now has ten members: the Dir
ector-General of Fisheries; the Chairperson; 
one NZ Federation of Commercial Fishennen Incorpor
ated representative; one NZ Sharefishermen' s 
Association Inc representative; two NZ Seafood Proc
essors' Association Inc representatives; one 
representative of fish retailers; one other member, an
d two members nominated by the Treaty of 
Waitangi Fisheries Commission. 
217 Sections 23, 24, 26, 28-32, 35 and 36 Settlement Ac
t with regard toss 28B, 280, 28W, 28ZE, 30, 
47, 86 and 107G Fisheries Act 1983. 
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on the variation of resource rentals. The Comm
ission thus has a continuing role as an 
advocate for Maori interests.218 
iii Traditional fishing rights 
The Sealord deal establishes a new Maori trad
itional fishing regime.219 The basic idea is 
that Maori traditional fishing rights no longer d
erive their status from the Treaty or from 
aboriginal title, but instead from regulations m
ade by the Crown. 22o Treaty rights and 
obligations continue to exist, but they cannot b
e legally enforced.221 
Under the new regime, the Minister has a cont
inuing general obligation, acting in 
accordance with Treaty principles, to "consult
 with tangata whenua about and develop 
policies to help recognise use and managemen
t practices of Maori in the exercise of non-
commercial fishing rights."
222 The Minister also has a specific obligation to
 recommend 
the making of regulations:223 
[T]o recognise and provide for customary food g
atllering by Maori and the special relationship 
between tangata whenua and those places which 
are of customary food gathering imJX)nance .. . 
218Toe continuing role of the Treaty of Waitangi Fisher
ies Commission is emphasised by the Chairman
 
of the Commission, Mr O'Regan: 
When I first came to the Commission, I believed
 that once we had wrapped up the allocation of 
our assets to Iwi, then I and my colleague Com
missioners could retreat back to our respective 
Iwi and offer what ever assistance we could to t
hem as they fashioned out their fishing futures . 
. . . That view of the Commission ' s future is no
 longer supportable. With the new legislation, 
the Commission is now faced with a demand
ing future and a variety of new functions to 
perform. (Report of the Chairman of the Treaty
 of Waitangi Fisheries Commission to lwi for 
the twelve months ended 30 June 1993, pres
ented to the Hui-a-Tau : Treaty of Waitangi 
Fisheries Commission Hui-a-Tau, above nl69, 6.) 
219Traditional fisheries were not adequately provided f
or in the Memorandum of Understanding. The
 
Memorandum provided only for "requests by M
aori to the Government that it develop policies 
to 
help recognise traditional use and management p
ractices": clause 5(k). There was a strong reactio
n 
against this by iwi and the Crown and Maori w
ere forced to negotiate fun.her. S Jones, Treaty 
of 
Waitangi Fisheries Commissioner and former C
rown negotiator, interview with the writer, 1 Ju
ly 
1993. The Settlement Act makes considerably mo
re detailed provision for traditional fishing rights
. 
22°'These provisions apply only to non-commercial fish
ing for species or classes of fish, aquatic life, o
r 
seaweed that are subject to the Fisheries Act 198
3. They do not affect non-commercial interests i
n 
indigenous fish such as eels, smelt, whitebait, 
and other freshwater fisheries, or in acclimatis
ed 
sports fish such as trout or salmon: these are man
aged tmder the Conservation Act 1987. Treaty an
d 
aboriginal title rights to non-commercial interes
ts in these fish thus continue as before. This wa
s 
not clear in the Deed of Settlement Fisheries Settlem
ent, 4, 8-9. 
22 1Sections lO(a) and (d) Settlement Act. The Waitang
i Tribunal will still be able to hear claims with
 
respect to traditional non-commercial fisheries b
ased on the Crown's continuing Treacy obligation
s. 
The Settlement Act's effect on aboriginal title r
ights is less clear. The issue is whether provisio
n 
that an aboriginal title right has no legal effec
t, except to the extent that it is provided for 
in 
regulations, exhibits a sufficient "clear and pla
in" intention to extinguish that right Hamlet of 
Baker Ulke v Minister of Indian Affairs a!Ui Nonhem D
evelopment (1979) 107 DLR (3d) 513. 
222Section lO(b) Settlement Act. 
223Section lO(c) Settlement Act. The Minister is empowe
red to do so bys 89(1)(mb) Fisheries Act 1983, 
as amended bys 34{1) Settlement Act. 
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, to the extent that such food gathering is neilher commercial in any way nor for pecuniary gain 
or trade. 224 
The Settlement Act contemplates two types of traditional fishing regulations. 
First. general regulations are to be promulgated which provide for tribes to regulate tribe 
members and tauiwi who seek to take fish under customary authority in any pan of their 
rohe. 22.5 The regulations will provide for tribes to control the taking of fish under their 
authority for defined customary uses within the overall goal of sustainable fisheries 
use.226 
There are, however, a number of questions, practical and theoretical, yet to be resolved. 
On a practical level, issues arise concerning the procedures for identifying fishers with 
customary approval; the means of recording the quantity of fish taken from an area in 
order to be able to assess traditional take within the TAC; the penalties for non-
compliance; and the authority of iwi fisheries officers. n 7 On a theoretical level, there are 
questions surrounding the identification of the group which holds rangatiratanga over the 
area; if and when the Crown should be able to override the tribe on sustainability issues; 
who defines the customary uses allowed; and how acceptable traditional gift exchange, 
koha and utu, is distinguished from non-acceptable commercial purposes, such as trade 
and barter. 228 
224These regulations will not provide, therefore, for the protection of areas important for spiritual or 
cultural reasons, or for the gathering of marine species not used for food. These are covered onl
y by 
the taiapure provisions of the Maori Fisheries Act 1989, which remain in force. Taiapure rese
rves 
may not, however, be able to fill these needs, as they apply only to littoral or estuarine waters, a
nd 
do not allow discrimination on the grounds of race. 
225Tois is intended to give the effective regulatory control insufficiently provided by s88(2) and the 
Amateur Fishing Regulations. Although some saw the s88(2) jurisprudence as an impo
rtant 
opportunity for a developing bicultural jwisprudence (McHugh "Sealords and Sharks", above nl 76
, 
357), others have emphasised the practical problems of s88(2). There was continuing confusio
n in 
the District Court surrounding the extent of rights and the evidential requirements, and, in prac
tice, 
the reliance on unstructured traditional controls did not allow tribes adequately to control 
their 
fisheries . As the Waitangi Tribunal commented in Muriwhenua: 
rnhe right of regulation has become a duty in our time, to protect the resource and to brin
g 
certainty to the law. It is also contrary to the public intereSt when Maori purponing to exercis
e 
customary fishing rights cannot be made bound to their own tribal rules . (230; Fisheries 
Settlement . 8-9.) 
226Toe Amateur Fishing Regulations continue as a temporary measure. amended to extend the range of 
traditional uses covered and to allow power to be delegated to kaitiaki: r 27 Amateur Fishing 
Regulations 1986, as amended bys 37 Settlement ACL 
227Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Kaitiaki o Kainwana - Treaty of Waitangi ( Fisheries Claims) 
Settlement Regulations - A Discussion Paper (Wellington, July 1993), 11-14. 
228 Above n227. 
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Secondly, regulations are to provide for the specia
l relationship between tribes and places 
of particular importance for customary food gathe
ring - mahinga mataitai.229
 These 
mahinga mataitai regulations will be site specific a
nd will enable kaitiaki to make bylaws 
regulating the use of the resource within the overa
ll sustainability requirements of the 
regulations. The by-laws could, for example, proh
ibit fishing, commercial or non-
commercial. at any or all times, establish seasons,
 or place limitations on the number or 
size of fish able to be taken. Bylaws must apply to
 all individuals equally, and be 
approved by the Minister of Fisheries.23° The kaitiaki may, 
however, have the power to 
waive the application of those by laws "for purpos
es which sustain the functions of the 
marae concerned. "231 
These traditional fishing regulations have not yet 
been made and a process of discussion 
and consultation as to their content is now taking 
place. 232 
c Conclusion 
The Sealord deal is an acknowledgement that Trea
ty fishing rights have been breached by 
Crown legislation and practices in the past and an 
attempt to uphold them now in the 
context of the modern fishing resource. 
IV THE TREATY OF W AITANGI AND THE
 SEALORD DEAL 
The Sealord deal recognises the Treaty of W aitang
i as a fundamental constitutional 
document which must now be honoured.The deal 
represents the first major attempt by the 
Crown to resolve Treaty grievances since the 194
0's.233 It is presented as the model for a 
new wave of Treaty claims settlements,
234 with the National government committed to the 
resolution of all historical Treaty claims by the ye
ar 2000.235 
229Section 89(1C) Fisheries Act 1983, inserted by s34
(2) Settlement AcL 
230Section 89(3B) Fisheries Act 1983, inserted by s34
(4) Settlement Act. 
231 Section 89(1C)(e) Fisheries Act 1983, inserted by s
34(2) Settlement Act. 
232See Treaty of WaiLangi Fisheries Commission Mahinga K
aimoana Tuturu - Customary and Tradili.onaJ 
Fishing Regulations - A Discussion Documenr for Iwi (
April 1993); Kaiti.aki o Kaimoana, above 
n227. There are to be regional bui convened to disc
uss these papers; a revised paper issued by the 
Treaty of WaiLangi Fisheries Commission and MA
F together, and a working group comprising 
MAF and Commission representatives to draft tbe regu
lations: Kaitiaki o Kaimoana, above n227, 
4-5. 
233 Previous settlements bad been either interim, su
ch as tbe Maori Fisheries Act 1989, or merely 
procedural, such as tbe SOE Act settlements relatin
g to Landcorp lands, broadcasting assets, forest 
assets, and surplus railway lands (see discussion in
 Chief Judge Durie "Politics and the Treaty", 
paper presented to the New Zealand Law Conference
, March 1993) 
234Toe Deputy Prime Minister, Rt Hon Mr D Mc.Kinnon
, stated; 
I want to say to all tbe land claimants whom 
the government is dealing with that the 
Government's commitment is to achieve similar
 types of objectives. We want to achieve 
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Does the Sealord deal. however, fulfil the Trea
ty of Wait.angi in the circumstances of 1993 
and is it an appropriate basis on which to proce
ed with Treaty claims settlements? In this 
part, we assess the Sealord deal. as discussed i
n Part III. against the Treaty framework 
developed in Part II. We look, first. to issues o
f process, and, secondly, to those of 
content. 
A Process 
Treaty claims settlements must have procedural
 legitimacy. There are considerable 
difficulties here for the Sealord deal. We look,
 first. to the Treaty claims process, and, 
secondly, to particular aspects of the negotiatio
n process. 
1 The Treaty claims process 
The Treaty claims process must involve a comm
ionent to negotiation as the means of 
determining the practical requirements of the Tr
eaty; to the Waitangi Tribunal to explicate 
the factual basis of a claim and the relevant Tre
aty principles; and to the courts, as a 
procedural safeguard on the negotiation proces
s. 
The Sealord fisheries settlement did adhere to 
this process and, to this extent, it has 
procedural legitimacy. What is of concern, how
ever, is the clear Crown intention to depart 
from this process in the future. The Crown may
 be commited to direct negotiation as a 
means of resolving Treaty claims, but there is n
o affirmation of those other institutions 
which corn plement and safeguard the Treaty cl
aims process. 
acceptance, an understanding that we will not
 go over the issue again, and the feeling that 
honour bas been restored. (New Zealand Parlime
mary Debates Vol 529, 1992: 11220.) 
The New Zealand Maori Council and the Nation
al Maori Congress are said to be attempling to extra
polate 
the Sealord formula as a "generic" solution to ou
tstanding Treaty land claims in order to acquire t
he 
government-owned Landcorp: F O'Sullivan "Sim
ple solution to Sealord problem was always 
highly improbable" The National Business Revi
ew, 11 December 1992, 11. This is of concern for 
some: "Before any serious consideration is given
 to this kaupapa. we do not want the errors of the
 
construction of I.be Sealord deal repealing itself.
" (A Tumahai "Landcorp As Settlement for Mao
ri 
Land Claims?" Te Maori News January 1993, 5.
) 
235This commitment was first made in the Nation
al Party 1990 election manifesto: Facing the F
uture 
Together, above nl 1. It has been affirmed on a
 number of occassions, including the Prime 
Minister's speech on I.be introduction of the Set
tlement Act: New Zealand Parliamentary Debat
es 
Vo! 532, 1992: 12827. 
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a The Waitangi Tribunal 
The significance of the Waitangi Tribunal was clea
rly demonstrated in the Sealord deal. 
The Tribunal played a key "missionary" role. estab
lishing the imponance of the fisheries 
taonga, the history of its extensive use. and the Tre
aty development righL It had a major 
impact on the settlement negotiated between the Cr
own and Maori. 
Beyond Sealord. however. the Crown has made litt
le commianent to the Waitangi 
Tribunal playing this role in future Treaty settlemen
ts. The Crown has made a larger 
budgetary allocation to the Treaty of W aitangi Polic
y Unit of the Deparunent of Justice 
("TOWPU'), which arranges negotiations. than tha
t to the Tribunal.236 It is currently 
negotiating the Tainui claim without a prior Tribun
al report.237 The Crown has also 
limited the jurisdiction of the W aitangi Tribunal: th
e Settlement Act prevents Maori from 
taking claims with respect to commercial fishing rig
hts or the Sealord deal itself to the 
Tribunal; 238 and the Treaty of W aitangi Amendmen
t Act 1993 responds to political 
pressure to cut back the Tribunal's recommendator
y power over private land. 
· This is of major concern. The Waitangi Tribunal m
ust be recognised as a fundamental part 
of the Treaty claims settlement process, not subject
 to political interference, and funded 
appropriately. It is vital that we have an independen
t body to establish the facrual basis of 
Treaty claims, extend our conception of Treaty prin
ciples, and provide an ongoing check 
on the continuing validity of Treaty settlements. Th
e W aitangi Tribunal process may well 
be a necessary part of the progression towards legitim
ate settlements, and a component of 
their long-term durability. 
b The courts 
The importance of the courts was also highlighted 
in the Sealord deal. Fishing rights were 
only negotiated because Maori were able to get judi
cial protection through s88(2) of the 
Fisheries Act 1983. 
The Crown has, however, demonstrated its antipath
y to the courts in this protective role. 
With regard to fishing rights, the Settlement Act ha
s removed the court's ability to monitor 
the implementation of the settlement or to ensure its
 continued validity. With regard to 
Treaty claims in general, the limited ability of the c
ourts to safeguard negotiation has been 
236Chief Judge Durie "Politics and Treaiy Law", above n23
3. 
237s Evans ·'Seeking common ground" The Dominion, W
ellington, 10 July 1992, 7. 
238Section 6 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, as amended
 by s40 Settlement AcL 
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maintained. There has been no general statutory inco
rporation of the Treaty, and the 
legislative trend is to incorporate the Treaty, if at all, as 
a relevant consideration, rather 
than a substantive limit on decision-making. 239 
The Crown has thus reasserted its control of the Trea
ty claims settlement process. The 
Crown will negotiate when and if it likes,
240 and on terms it chooses.241 Maori are tied 
back into their former status as political and moral claim
ants only; supplicants not 
litigants. 242 
c Conclusion 
The Treaty settlement process may have worked wel
l in the Sealord deal, but there is no 
commitment by the Crown to that process. This threa
tens the procedural legitimacy of 
future Treaty claims settlements. 
2 The negotiation process 
· The Treaty of Waitangi requires that negotiations towards
 Treaty claims settlements are 
conducted reasonably, honourably, and with the utrn
ost good faith. We saw below that 
unresolved difficulties surroW1d the negotiation proc
ess, in particular with regard to 
bargaining power, representation and ratification, an
d public acceptability. The Sealord 
deal, however, demonstrates no commitment to reso
lving these issues. Rather, it 
highlights the danger of proceeding with Treaty claim
s settlements without so doing. 
239See Legislation Advisory Commirree, above nl 1. 
240Despite the year 2000 commitment, the Crown s
eems in no hurry. There were 271 known claim
s 
pending in March 1992, but only a few small settle
ments and the Sealord deal have been concluded: 
Kelsey, Rolling Back the State, above n49, 259. The 
Ngai Tahu and Tainui claims have been under 
negotiation since 1991 and Te Roroa since 1992
 ("Seeking common ground", above n237), but 
there bas been no indication of progress. 
241 The Crown is to make clear what types of natural
 resource claims, for example, it considers valid i
n 
the Treaty claims policy which it is to release: "Pa
rty's over for Bolger", above n207. The Crown 's 
disestablishment of the Crown-Congress Joint Wo
rking Party on Railway Lands also demonscrates 
effective Crown control. Initially bailed as an imp
ortant new process for Treacy claims settlement 
(Chief Judge Durie "Politics and Treaty Law", abo
ve n233), the Working Party was put aside when 
it began to make settlements the Crown regarde
d as inappropriate. The Labour Government's 
Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Wa
itangi (CAB (89) Ml6/19, 22 May 1989) 
demonstrate also the Crown's power position. Al
though the Crown may have protested that the 
principles were not an attempt to rewrite the Treat
y (Frame, above nl36, 88), if they represent the 
only basis on which the Crown will negotiate, then that 
is their substantive effect 
242D Lange '"Full and final' and very unsettling" The Domin
ion, Wellington, 7 September 1992, 6. 
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a Bargaining power 
The Sealord deal was negotiated around the s
ale of Sealord Fisheries Ltd. Seizing that 
opportunity was seen by Maori as critical to t
he settlement of Treaty fishing claims. Maori
 
recognised that Sealord's quota was needed f
or settlement, that settlement was needed 
soon, and that litigation posed considerable risk
s. Maori recognised also that the deal had 
to be done within the short time-frame forced
 by the Sealord tender. 
In these circumstances, the Maori negotiators, and
 those iwi who ratified the deal, felt no 
option but to take the deal, whatever their res
ervations about its content or the procedure 
by which it had been reached In response to the qu
estion "Is this a good deal for Maori", 
the Maori negotiators were able to reply only
 "[This is] the best deal that Maori will 
get"243 As Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan empha
sised in Parliament:244
 
I believe that, given the opportunity, even
 the negotiators would not have given up 
[Treaty 
rights]. In fact, I have heard one of them say
 that he did not agree with giving up Treaty ri
ghts. 
Nevertheless he is a signatory ... Those com
mercial fishing rights ... are being extingui
shed ... 
in a manner that no Maori can really accept. 
There was a clear imbalance of bargaining po
wer in the Sealord deal which threatened its 
legitimacy. 245 
The Crown, as a reasonable Treaty partner, s
hould have acted to remove this imbalance. 
That Sealord was the last opportunity for the 
Crown to settle Maori claims should have 
been the Crown's concern, not that of Maori.
 That Maori had fundamental reservations 
about the deal should have indicated the impo
ssibility of a lasting settlement The Crown 
could, for example, have purchased Sealord 
on its own behalf. In that way, it would have 
243 The Sealord Deal - What it means for Maori, ab
ove nlO. 
244 New l.ealand Parliamentary Debates Vol 53
2, 1992: 12839. 
245 A similar situation occurred in the "full and
 final" land claims seulements of the 1940'
s, in Taranak:i, 
Waikato, and Ngai Tahu (below n ). In respons
e to the question "why did the tribes accept 
full and 
final payments?", Hill has suggested that pa
rt of the answer is that 
[llhey saw that they had no choice if they
 were to receive any compensation at all. 
Mrs E 
Tombleson MP put it this way in 1972 v
is a vis the renewed Ngai Tahu claim be
fore the 
Maori Affairs Committee: "It was found 
that each petitioner was of the opinion t
hat the 
decision in 1944 was not completely bindin
g and that they thought, to quote the petitio
ners of 
that time, that half a loaf was better than no
 bread." This does not imply duplicity on the p
an 
of the claimants: acceptance of "half a loaf'
 does not preclude hope that in the future th
e donor 
might become more generous, particularly
 if the donor's role in the impoverishmen
t of the 
recipient in the first place is more fully ap
preciated. The negotiators of the 1940's wi
ll have 
noted keenly, by virtue of the fact that se
ttlement was pending after so long, that p
olitical 
standards and public mores alter over time.
 (R Hill Settlemen.Js of Major Maori Claims
 in the 
1940's: A Preliminary Historical Investigatio
n (Wellington, Deparonent of Justice, 1989),
 12.) 
-48 -
1111111 1111111111111111111111111 11111 11111111111111 1111111111 11111 11111 1
1111111 
3 7212 00590133 3 
~) 
::S-
b 
--) ~ 
J+ 
demonstrated its commiunent to settlement, and would
 have given both parries the time to 
work through the key issues of procedure, and also su
bstance, which were arsing here 
and would arise again in future Treaty settlements. 
The Crown's failure in the Sealord deal to accept any 
responsibility for the imbalance of 
bargaining power is of considerable concern. 
246 It is a clear breach of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. 
b Representation and ratification 
The Sealord deal, as a Treaty claims settlement which
 affects the rights of all Maori, raises 
significant procedural issues. How are we to ensure th
at those who negotiate on behalf of 
all have the authority to do so and can be held account
able for their actions? How are we 
to determine that those whose rights are affected have 
given their genuine consent? The 
Sealord deal failed to look for, or to find, answers to 
these questions. 
i Representation 
Maori interests were represented in the negotiation of 
the Sealord deal by the Maori 
negotiators. Were these people, however, given their a
uthority by Maori and were they 
able to be held accountable to Maori? 
There must be significant doubt. Although the Maori neg
otiators were authorised by the 
1992 Hui-a-Tau to seek a settlement with the Crown, f
ew are likely to have envisaged the 
effect of this. The Maori negotiators, however, took th
eir mandate as an authority to 
negotiate the Sealord deal in secret and without consul
tation with iwi. They concluded a 
deal which was in many respects contrary to the basic 
expectations of their principals: the 
lack of consideration for traditional fisheries, freshwat
er fisheries and pre-existing 
settlements was revealing. They reached a settlement. 
whilst those they purported to 
represent remained largely ill-informed, suspicious an
d confused. 
There are thus considerable difficulties in saying that t
he Maori negotiators represented the 
will of Maoridom. The Maori negotiators, in fact. would seem to h
ave advanced their own 
perceptions of what is good for Maori. The Treaty sett
lement was, in effect, determined 
by a few, for the end benefit of all. 
246The Minister of Maori Affairs stated: 
It was not our desire to do it quickly or in haste, but a
n opportunity came. which if let pass 
would virtually have guaranteed that it would be im
possible to progress the matter in a 
reasonable time-frame or ever. (New Zealand Parliament
ary Debates Vol 532, 1992: 12843.) 
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The Crown, however, again ignored these dif
ficulties.247 As the Prime Minister stated 
confidently:24 8 
This is the agreed way; this is not an im
posed way. This is the way that was agreed i
n 
negotiations and discussions with the Maori
 negotiators. We did not appoint them. The 
Crown 
did not say that they had to be the negotiators.
 Maori appointed the negotiators. The negot
iators 
came to us. We sat down and negotiated hon
ourably with them. 
ii Ratification 
Ratification of the Sealord deal was, as a resu
lt of the lack of iwi structures, conducted in 
a series of regional hui. We have seen that the
re is much room for doubt whether the 
"consent" thus given was genuine, based on a
n informed understanding of the settlement. 
and achieved in accordance with the group's 
internal decision-making structures. 
The Crown argued, however, that that in the c
ircumstances, its acceptance of the 
ratification thus achieved was reasonable. The
 W aitangi Tribunal agreed:
249 
Given the task of explaining complex matte
rs to diverse groups and the business and po
litical 
imperatives, allegations of too much haste 
and too little information were inevitable. H
aving 
viewed the matter as a whole however, we a
re of opinion that the complaints are not justifie
d in 
all cases .... [nn the light of tbe report eman
ating from the hui it was reasonable for the 
Crown 
to believe it was justified in proceeding. 
With respect, however, the W aitangi Tribuna
l has ignored the broader responsibility of the
 
Crown to ensure appropriate iwi structures an
d to avert the need for haste. The Crown 
must not enter into Treaty claims settlements 
without addressing these basic issues. A 
failure to do so threatens the legitimacy of the
 settlement Once again, however, 
247Tue Crown's perceptions were obscured s
omewhat by its faith in the Maori negoti
ators. As the 
Minister of Maori Affairs stated: 
I say that this nation owes a huge debt to th
is principal plaintiffs ... . I. for one, believe 
that in 
the future annals of Maoridom, as the storie
s are told, those principal plaintiffs will shin
e forth 
as some of the great lights of their people (N
ew Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vo! 532,
 1992: 
12842.) 
248New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol 532
, 1992: 12951. 
249 Fisheries Settlement, 16. 
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the Crown ignored the difficulties. As the Prime Minister s
tated:250 
No piece of legislation bas been exposed more to th
e Maori people. Maori negotiators have 
traversed the country and talked to iwi after iwi . 
The Waitangi Tribunal did, however, emphasise that thi
s regional ratification would not be 
a sufficient basis on which to extinguish Treaty rights. O
nly those who consent should be 
bound.251 In the Sealord deal, however, the commercial
 fishing rights of all were 
abrogated, whilst only some consented. 
iii Conclusion 
The Sealord deal thus raises major issues with respect to
 representation and ratification. 
The Crown has made no commiunent to deal with these.
 The Minister of Justice made this 
quite clear:252 
The Government accepts that [there are structural p
roblems] but we are not going to wait 
another 100 years for Maori to sort out their own structure, 
having failed to do so for 1000 
years. We intend to get on with the job and to do as best 
we can in an imperfect world. 
We cannot "get on with the job" of honouring the Treaty
, however, until we have built a 
proper base by which to do so. 
c Public acceptability 
Treaty claims settlements require public acceptance in or
der to achieve procedural 
legitimacy. The Sealord deal demonstrates, however, no
 Crown recognition of the 
importance of achieving a general understanding of the r
equirements of the Treaty in 
1993. 
The Sealord deal itself was concluded in haste and secre
cy. There was no public 
discussion, no public education campaign, no opportunit
y for public input. and little 
understanding by parliamentarians of the Act they were 
passing. 253 The taking of urgency 
25°New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vo! 532, 1992: 
12826. See also the comments of the Minister of 
Justice with respect to urgency, above n . 
25 1 Fisheries Settlement, 17. 
252New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol 532, 1992: 12
951. 
253Govemment MP's, in particular, demonstrated a woeful ignocan
ce of the Trea!y and the Seal<X'd deal in 
the debate on the passage of the Settlement Act. The Ca
ucus generally bas made little effort to get 
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is also of concem.254 There was no attempt earlier to explain the findings of the Waitangi 
Tribunal,255 and the need for a Treaty claims settlement, and after the settlement, no effort 
to clarify its implications.256 There can be little public acceptance of the Sealord deal in 
these circumstances. 
Treaty claims settlement, in general, is shrouded by misconception and 
misunderstanding. 257 The Crown has sought to bypass the issues with a minimum of 
fuss. The Minister of Justice has made this clear:258 
The people of New Zealand say to me all the time: '"'There are grievances there; there were 
wrongs done: I don't know the detail; I don't particularly want to know the detail. but I accept 
that they were done. Where the Government finds that that is true, do something about it. 
Don't get carried away; don't write out the large cheques: don't go overboard, but be fair and 
restore the honour of the Crown. 
on top of the issues and bas not turned up for Treaty briefings: "Simple solution", above n234. 
The consequences for electocate tmderstandings are obvious. 
254 As Sonja Davies said in Parliament: 
The Minister said tonight that much consultation has already taken place, but., because of the 
widespread confusion, anger, and misconceptions that are abroad, if all the various interest 
groups do not have the chance to make submissions and to be heard, justice will not be done. 
(New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol 532, 1992: 12937.) 
There are also constiUJtional issues here which have gone unexplored. Kelsey explains: 
The extra-parliamentary status of the agreements which were reached raised difficult 
consititutional issues. The negotiations were undertaken on behalf of the Crown by the 
executive, but their implenentation usually required legislation. Normally, a Bill would be 
subjected to parliamentary debate and submissions beore a select committee to allow MP' s and 
outsiders to participate in the law-making process. (It is] unclear how far a select committee 
could alter the terms which Maori and the Crown had agreed to, whether Maori could withdraw 
their consent if the agreements were amended, and what the constitutional implications were if 
they were deemed non-negotiable. (Kelsey, Rolling Back the Stare, above n49, 254.) 
255Toe Dominion coverage of the Ngai Tahu Report announced "Maoris get SI Fishery" and stated that 
the Waitaogi Tribunal had recommended that "most of the South Island's fisheries be handed over 
to the Ngai Tahu." Belgrave comments "[c]overage of the report must have caused considerable and 
unnecessary concern among thousands of recreational and commercial fishermen" : M Belgrave 
"Maori fishery claims need clarifying" The Dominion, Wellington, 18 August 1992, 6. Mr Lange 
comments with regard to the Waitangi Tribunal generally: 
[T)he tribunal must be given the resources and the expertise to explain its role and findings of 
the general public. As it is, it seems to be a trigger of sporadic political and popular melt-
down. it is W1Decessary for the source of much enlightenment to be simultaneously the well of 
such alarm. ("Full and final", above n242.) 
256The traditional fishing regulations are particularly misunderstood by the fishing industry and the public 
generally. They raised the fears of commercial fishers form the outset: "Fishing rights for all - PM" 
The Dominion, Wellington, 8 December 1992, 1. They continue now, resurfacing on the release of 
the Crown's discussion document for traditional fisheries: H Barlow "Fishing to be non-exclusive. 
say officials" The Dominion, Wellington, 6 August 1993, 5. 
257Toere is "an almost paranoid secrecy about (the Crown's Treaty] policy and approach to senlemem of 
claims": Kelsey, Rolling Back the State, above n49, 257. The National Government has not yet 
released a Treaty claims policy, although it has been "labouring over [one] since it took office": 
"Party's over for Bolger", above n.206. 
258 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol 532, 1992: 12953. 
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This is no basis for the people of New Zealand
 to work carefully through the structural 
and attitudinal changes which the Treaty requir
es in 1993. It is rather facilitative of instant. 
chequebook answers, rather than real solutions
 which shift power and resources. 
"Political acceptability" is only a function of un
derstanding; it should not be used to fob 
off Maori claimants with less than the Treaty req
uires. There must be a Crown 
commitment to build public acceptance of the T
reaty ofWaitangi. 
3 Conclusion 
In the Sealord deal, the Crown and the Maori negotia
tors seized the chance to finally settle 
Treaty fishing claims. Both recognised the proc
edural difficulties, but both saw the 
Sealord deal as an opportunity which "had to b
e taken at its flood." 
This is, however, to view the Sealord deal solely in t
enns of outcomes. Treaty claims 
resolution, however, is not only about the subs
tance of a senlement. but also the means by 
which it is achieved. It is in this way that we en
sure that a settlement accords with the 
principles of the Treaty and the needs of all, an
d caries with it the mana of both Treaty 
partners. We cannot continue to negotiate Treat
y claims senlements without first giving 
real and concerted attention to the outstanding 
issues of process. 
B Content 
The Treaty of Waitangi provides the basic fram
ework for government in New Zealand. 
There are three main Treaty principles: partnership
, kawanatanga, and rangatiratanga. We 
look in this section to their recognition in the S
ealord deal. 
1 Partnership 
The Sealord deal is a full and final senlement o
f Maori Treaty fishing rights. Treaty 
commercial fishing rights are effectively abrogated
 and non-commercial rights are 
prevented from judicial enforcement The Crow
n has, in this way, purported to fulfil its 
Treaty obligations, quantify its liability, and ass
ure the people of New Zealand that there 
will be no more Maori fishing claims. 
We may question whether this is in accordance
 with the Treaty of Waitangi and the 
principle of partnership. We consider the Sealo
rd deal with regard, first, to the status of 
the Treaty; secondly, to the nature of Treaty rights; a
nd, thirdly, to the practicality of ftnal 
senlernents. 
L/, \' .' 1.1 ~0;..:-=,Y 
• 'I V'-R '~ITY OF \ . C::LL,i .GTON. 
VICTORIA U,' '- , ..:i 
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a The status of the Treaty 
The Treaty of Waitangi is New Zealand's fundamental constitutional document The 
Sealord deal purports to amend the Treaty. It may be doubted whether that is possible:259 
[A] nation cannot cast itself adrift from its own foundations. The Treaty stands . ... Whatever 
constitutional or fiduciary significance the Treaty may have of its own force, or as a result of 
past or present statutory recognition, could only remain. 
The Treaty is the basis for the evolving parmership between the Crown and Maori. That 
relationship does not conclude with regard to a particular reource with the settlement of a 
grievance:260 
[Al political or social contract between two people is by its very nature something to be 
developed over time. It is not capable of finite settlement at any particular stage in history: 
The Sealord deal is, however, perceived by many Maori, not merely to change the 
institutional nature of the Maori proprietorial interest in the fisheries resource, but to 
attempt to extinguish the status of Maori.261 
The Sealord deal thus fails to appreciate the natue of the Treaty of W aitangi. 
262 The Treaty 
is perceived by the Crown not as a constitution but, rather, as a contract, which guarantees 
certain property rights, and which is discharged on the settlement of a claim. 
263 
b The Treaty right 
Treaty rights, sourced as they are in an ongoing parmership, have a special character. 
They develop for different times and needs, but the underlying obligation remains as a 
constant: 264 
259Te Wharekauri a Rekohu, above nl91, 308-309 
26°Chief Judge Durie, 'The Waitangi Tribunal: Its relations.hip with the judicial system", above 060, 
236. 
261s Jones, interview with the writer, 1 July 1993. Mr Jones added: "we don't want to just see pieces of 
silver handed over and have anyone think that that reflects a cessation of the relationship between 
our grandchildren and the Queen." 
262Perhaps this is because of our relative lack of constiwtional experience. 
263Robb, "Who are the Sea Lords now?", above nl96, 26. 
264 Fisheries Settlement, 11. 
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The essence of the Treaty is that it is all future looking. It is no
t about finite rules. or final 
pay-offs. no maner bow handsome. It is about the maintenance of p
rinciple over ever-changing 
circmnstances. 
The Treaty fishing right may transmute, therefore, into quota righ
ts, or shares in a fishing 
company, but there will be a continuing obligation to respect Maori 
rangatiratanga.265 
Treaty settlements should, therefore, affirm Treaty rights, althoug
h acknowledging that 
the Crown' s current obligations with respect to those rights are n
ow satisfied. 266 That 
acknowledgment should not, however, exceed 25 years, or one g
eneration.267 
The Sealord deal fails to appreciate the nature of Treaty rights. Ma
ori receive benefits 
under the deal, but accept in return, that the Crown has no ongoin
g responsibilities. 268 
Further, Treaty rights must also be viewed in a holistic sense. The
 Treaty guarantees 
rights to a resource base, to tribal self-management, to biculturalis
m in govemmenL The 
Crown cannot satisfy Treaty rights piecemeal. 
To this extent also, the Sealord deal is misconceived. The Crown
's attempt to abrogate 
Treaty fishing rights still leaves it with the broader obligation to r
eturn adequate resources 
to Maori. 
c Practical impossibility 
The Sealord "full and final settlement" has, also, a more basic dif
ficulty. It is practically 
impossible:269 
[N]o Act of Parliament is ever final .... This is a political settle
ment for the present time, 
under today's circumstances; it cannot be more than that.; and it should 
not be pretended that it 
is more than that. Any real and unfair discrimination or failure to re
solve legitimate grievances 
will ultimately have to be dealt with by a subsequent Parliament. 
265 Fisheries Settlement, 22. 
266Fisheries Settlement, 10. The acknowledgment could reasonably include
 a moratorium on court action 
and a statutory discontinuance of existing court proceedings. There
 seems no reason, however, for 
the Waitangi Tribunal to lose jurisdiction. 
267 Fishen·es Settlement, 24. See also Living Treaties: Lasting Agreem
ents, above nl05, 41-43 . 
268 As Robb commented: 
To some observers it's like selling a product only on the condition
 that the buyer gives up all 
rights as a consumer. Even if the goods are not what they seem, th
e buyer can do nothing. (A 
Robb "Who are the Sea Lords now?'', above nl96, 26.) 
269Mr J Anderton MP, Leader of the Alliance. New Zealand Parliamen
tary Debates Vo! 532, 1992: 
12955. 
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We have seen this in the full and final settlements of the
 1940's - in Taranak:i, Waikato and 
Ngai Tahu270 - which were good faith attempts to settle 
Maori land grievances but which 
"proved in time to be unjust, founded as they were on a
n inflation-free world."271 More 
recently, we have seen the experiences of Ngati Whatua
 at Orakei where an initial 
settlement in 1978 was, within a few years. seen as inef
fective,272 and another settlement 
made in 1991. 273 The oversea experience of full and fin
al settlements also spells 
caution.274 
To promise a final settlement is, therefore, hannful. For
 Maori, the basis is thus laid for a 
continuing grievance. For the general public, finality is 
offered "to lull [their] suspicions 
... , suspicions which will be redoubled when one day the 
settlement is revisited."275 
d Conclusion 
The Sealord deal demonstrates a Crown attitude towards
 Treaty claims settlements which 
threatens partnership in New Zealand. The Treatys view
ed as a "problem" to be "solved", 
a temporary aberration to be smoothed away.2
76 The Treaty of Waitangi is not recognised 
as a fundamental constitutional docwnent affinning Mao
ri in a status as ongoing Treaty 
partners, and necessitating ongoing sUllctural and attitud
inal change in the exercise of 
government 277 The Sealord deal is no basis for future T
reaty claims settlements. 
270raranaki Maori Land Claims Seulement Act 1944; Ngai Tahu 
Claim Settlement Act 1944; Waikalo-
Maniopoto Maori Claims Settlement Act 1946: Hill, above n.246,
 11-12. 
271 mu, above n245, 11-12. Hill writes: 
The extant doclllilentation wbicb bas been uncovered so far on th
e historical settlements of the 
twentieth century does not reveal duplicity or bad faith on the p
an of either of the parmers to 
the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori or the Crown. Rather it reveal
s a determination by both to 
resolve finally longstanding grievances in good faith, in accor
dance with the standards and 
realities of the time. (13) 
272.orakei Block (Vesting and Use) Act 1978. See Orakei, 173-176.
 
2730rakei Act 1991. 
274With regard to Canada, see Living Treaties: Lasting Agreements, abo
ve nl05, 35-43. For Alaska, see 
TR Berger Village Journey - The Repon of the Alaska Native Re
view Commissioner (Hill & 
Wang, New York, 1985). 
275Lange, "Full and final", above n242. 
276In 1989, the present Prime Minister gave a speech entitled "One 
Nation under One Law" in which he 
stated: 
Extremists - Maori and non-Maori - are using the 150th anni
versary of the signing of the 
Treaty of Waitangi to drive a racist wedge through our nation ..
.. We are determined that the 
next generation of New Zealanders will not be burdened with th
e race relations problems that 
have characterised New Zealand in the late 1980's. (Quoted in K
elsey, Rolling Back the Stare. 
above n49, 237.) 
National's 1990 election manifesto stated that "National will quick
ly resolve outstanding Maori grievances 
that are genuine and proven" and will "seek to settle all major out
standing Maori claims by the nrrn 
of the cennuy'': Facing the Future Together, above nl 1. 
277National's 1990 election manifesto also stated that "National's a
im is not to treat the Maori as a race 
apart needing special programmes and assistance, but rather, wher
e there is a need for help it will be 
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2 Kawanatanga 
The Treaty of Waitangi gave the Crown kawanatanga. a 
limited right of government How 
does the Sealord deal respect this Treaty principle? We c
onsider in this section, first. the 
QMS regime; secondly, Maori participation in fisheries m
anagement.; and thirdly, Maori 
traditional fishing rights. 
a The QMS 
The Crown has the right to make laws of general applica
tion for resource protection. The 
QMS has been accepted, therefore, as a conservation and
 management tool. 278 It has also 
been accepted that the QMS must regulate Maori as well 
as Pakeha fishing interests; the 
system could not operate effectively were Maori fishing 
rights to be excluded 
altogether. 279 
What need not be accepted is that the QMS must regulate
 Maori fishing rights in the same 
way as those of other users. Was it not possible, within t
he QMS, to take special account 
of the Maori Treaty interest? For example, iwi resource r
entals could have been charged 
on a different basis for Maori, thus protecting the value 
of the settlement 28° Further, the 
Crown has not adequately explained why the QMS could
 not provide for Maori traditional 
commercial fishing interests. The regime now makes no 
provision for small-scale pan-
time Maori fishers who want to fish, as they have long d
one. to supplement their incomes. 
The TAC could surely have included a limited Maori trad
itional commercial share, to be 
managed by iwi in addition to their non-commercial alloc
ation. 
The QMS, in addition, is solely the Crown's vision of an
 appropriate solution to 
management and conservation needs. Under the Sealord 
deal, Maori have merely bought 
into that vision, exchanging their Treaty fishing right for
 a Crown-derived, Crown-
defined ti tie. 28 I 
given because of that help and not on account of race
": Facing the Future Together, above nl 1. 
This aUitude was demonstrated in the debate on the Settleme
nt Act: 
Maori have the opportunity to take charge of their own
 destiny - a destiny that will not include 
an escape clause that refers back to the Treaty of Waitangi and
 the rights that go with it. Maori 
have the opportunity to take the same chances that th
e rest of us have to live with; the risks 
that are associated with investment, and the risks th
at are associated with making a living 
without some sort of crutch or special set of rights to fall b
ack on. (Mr M Bradford, MP, New 
Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol 532, 1992: 12962.) 
278Mun·whenua, 150. 
279 Fisheries Senlement, 17. 
280-Selow Part IV C 3 b ii. 
281 See McHugh "Sealords and Sharks", above nl76, 358. 
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The Crown 's failure to probe these issues demonstrates an inability to acc
ept pluralism, 
that the Treaty requires treating one section of the community differently f
rom another. 
The Sealord deal perpetuates the notion of "one nation under one law".
282 It is an 
illegitimate extension of kawanatanga. 
b Fisheries management 
The Crown has the right to manage the fisheries in the public interest The
 Crown must, 
however, offer Maori a substantive role in management in order to respect
 Maori 
rangatiratanga and the principle of partnership. 
In the Sealord deal the Crown asserts absolute control over the fisheries and re
jects a 
special status for Maori. Maori certainly have a larger role in fisheries man
agement than 
ever before. It is, however, only a role equivalent to that of the FIB, or an indu
stry 
interest group and is limited to consultation on major issues. There is no C
rown 
commiunent to a structure in which the Maori status as Treaty partner is affirmed
, Maori 
perspectives are effectively incorporated, and Maori have a substantive rol
e in all aspects 
of fisheries management 283 
c Traditional fisheries 
The Sealord deal' s traditional fisheries regime must be acknowledged as a step forw
ard. 
The Crown has acknowledged the Maori right to contr0l and management
 over their 
traditional fisheries within its responsibility to protect the fisheries in the p
ublic interest 
There are, however, some problematic aspects of the new regime. First, th
e traditional 
fishing regulations must be made subject to judicial review. As the Waitangi Trib
unal 
emphasised: 284 
Active protection requires in our view, access to the courts in appropriate case
 .... the danger is 
that Maori interests will become, as they have been before, overly sus
ceptible to political 
convenience or administrative preference .. . . We would expect judicial rev
iew to guard against 
that prospect. Certainly it would be contrary to the Treaty in our vie
w, if there was no 
provision to review the regulations against the Treary' s principles. 
282Tois was the title of a 1989 speech by .the present Prime Minister: above n
276. 
283Toe Crown Working Group Report in 1988 offered an interesting model al
ong these lines, but it was 
not further developed: above Part ill B 1 a. 
284 Fisheries Setrlement, 9. 
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Judicial review is a necessary procedural safeguard to ensure the
 appropriateness of the 
new regime and the effective limitation of the Crown's powers. 
Secondly, mahinga mataitai by laws should not require the approv
al of the Minister of 
Fisheries.285 If the Wellington City Council is not required to follow 
such a procedure, 
why must iwi?286 Requiring approval is an illegitimate extension
 of kawanatanga. 
Tbirdly, the mahinga mataitai bylaws. as they stand. must apply 
generally to all 
individuals. This is not consistent with Maori rangatiratanga. wh
ich gives Maori greater 
rights then others in the fisheries. It may be, however, that the no
n-discrimination 
provision will be marginalised in practice by an expansive interpr
etation of a "purpose 
which sustains the function of the marae." 
Fourthly, the traditional fisheries regime is limited to non-comme
rcial fishing. There may 
well, as we have seen, be no justification for this within kawanat
anga. Further, to draw a 
distinction between "acceptable" traditional gift exchange, koha a
nd utu, and "non-
acceptable" commercial purposes, such as trade, and barter. is to 
attempt to freeze Maori 
culture, contrary to the Treaty's development right
287 
d Conclusion 
The Crown thus maintains its assertion of absolute authority to l
egislate, define ownership 
and manage the fishing resource, although it does give limited rec
ognition to Maori 
rangatiratanga over traditional fisheries. This is inconsistent with
 the Treaty of W aitangi 
and the limited nature of kawanatanga. Absolute sovereignty mu
st not form the basis for 
Treaty claims settlement 
3 Rangatiratanga 
The Treaty of W aitangi' s guarantee of rangatiratanga requires in 
1993 the restoration of 
the tribe. This should be a focus of Treaty claims settlements. How far do
es the Sealord 
285Toey remian, of course, subject to judicial review and scrutiny by
 the Regulations Review Commiue. 
2B6pan XLIII Local Government Act 1974. 
287Mr Lange emphasised this point: 
What on earth is a traditional purpose? Do we know that? Has it bee
n specified? With no 
disrespect to some of my Maori friends, the traditional purpose in
 circles in which I move ... is 
also a sack of shellfish for a raffle in the pub .... Culture is not a
 frozen phenomenen .... That 
is the problem. There is no way that they can actualy define what
 constitutues those traditional 
areas. (New Zea.land Parliamentary Debates Vol 532, 1992: 12933.) 
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deal advance this objective? We look, first, to the general approa
ch, and, then, to specific 
issues relating to the economic base and tribal structure.
288 
a Approach 
The Sealord deal is a global settlement, for all iwi, of a single res
ource. It aims to honour 
the Crown's obligations with respect to that resource. This, it is s
ubmitted, is the wrong 
approach to Treaty claims resolution. Restoration of the tribe requ
ires settlements which 
focus directly on that objective, not on discharging liability on a c
ompensatory property 
rights basis. 
The Sealord deal gives Maori, through the Treaty of Waitangi Fi
sheries Commission, the 
responsibility of allocating the settlement assets amongst the tribe
s. The basis for 
allocation is to be the "principles of the Treaty of W aitangi", and 
thus should be the goal 
of tribal restoration. This does not, however, provide a clear basi
s for allocating the 
assets. The key difficulty is "relativities." Chief Judge Durie has e
mphasised the 
significance of this issue: "[t]he just resolution of Maori claims th
at are fair and 
reasonable, not only between the partners but amongst Maori the
mselves, presents the 
greatest challenge to the claims process."
289 The Sealord settlement asks Maori to 
determine these "new issues of equity." Maori are given the respo
nsibility of dividing the 
settlement assets so as to ensure that each tribe has a sufficient economic bas
e relative to 
each other tribe and considering the needs of each tribe; the asset
s already held by the 
tribe; and the assets which the tribe is likely to receive from the C
rown as a result of other 
settlements. Without knowledge, however, of the Crown's inten
tions with regard to 
future Treaty claims settlements, and without the resources on wh
ich to make these 
investigations, Maori cannot determine the "right" allocation. The
 impasse reached now 
reflects not so much tribal self-interest as "a division created by the settleme
nt framework 
dictated by the govemment."290 
The Sealord deal is, therefore, fundamentally flawed. The Crown
 cannot fulfil its 
responsibilities to Maori by offering a quantity of a single asset fo
r tribes to divide 
amongst themselves. The Crown, not Maori, has the responsibili
ty of ensuring that the 
tribe has a sufficient base, and the Crown, not Maori, must grapp
le with these issues of 
relativities. The Sealord deal represents an attempt by the Crown 
to discharge its Treaty 
288Issues of tribal autonony have been considered in the previous sectio
n: Part IV C 2 band c. 
289Chief Judge Durie, "Politics and Treaty Law", above n233 
29°Kelsey, Rolling Back the State, above n49: 269. 
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obligations without ever coming to terms with their substance. There must be no more 
Treaty settlements on this basis. 
b Tribal base 
Tribal restoration requires the reconstruction of an economic base. Each tribe must have 
the resources with which to panicipate in the economy of its traditional territory, and to 
provide for the present and future needs of its people. The Crown has an ongoing 
obligation to provide such a base and to protect it 
The Sealord deal raises concerns about the Crown's commiunent to the restoration of the 
tribal base. We look, first, to the provision of the base; secondly, to the nature of the 
fisheries assets; and, thirdly, to the Crown's ongoing role. 
i The base 
The Sealord fisheries settlement will give to most tribes some proportion of quota. cash, 
and shares in Sealord Fisheries Ltd. That does not, in itself, provide a sufficient economic 
base for the tribe. The Crown must make a commitment to provide for each tribe the 
additional resources, human and material, needed to develop and utilise the fisheries 
resource and to adequately cater for the tribe's needs. 
The Crown's commitment to this is dubious. The Crown has emphasised that it has 
limited funds and limited assets with which to settle claims: the Deed of Settlement warned 
that it would affect the Crown's ability to settle other grievances. Further, the Crown 's 
strategy on Treaty claims settlements is believed to centre around a "fiscal envelope" by 
which the Crown will set aside a maximum amount for Treaty claims settlements, and a 
certain amount for settlements each year.291 Fiscal realities must certainly be appreciated. 
There is, however, a heavy obligation upon the Crown to manage its asets so as to 
account for relativities between tribes and the particular needs of all. The Crown would 
need to provide a significant justification for a failure to achieve the goal of tribal 
restoration. 
291 "Party's over for Bolger". above n206; B Edwards "Early claims deadline tipped" The Evening Post, 
Wellington, 2 August 1993, 2. 
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ii The assets 
There are issues also surrounding the appropriateness of quota. cash, and Sealo
rd shares 
as providing a significant part of the restored tribal base. 
First, Sealord Fisheries Ltd is at present a profitable fishing company wi
th considerable 
development potential.292 There is, however, room for doubts as to its l
ong-term 
viability, as there is for the whole fishing industry.
293 The Crown can, of course, do little 
about this; it is an expected invesonent risk. What it does highlight, how
ever, is that 
giving Maori a company cannot be the basis for a full and final settlement of Maori
 fishing 
rights. The Crown must accept its continuing obligations. 
Secondly, the Sealord invesunent involves Maori in a joint venture with 
BIL. Will Maori 
be able to develop Sealord, therefore, in accordance with Maori sensitivities and pr
iorities? 
BIL has no Treaty obligations, and its only duty is to make a profit for it
s 
shareholders. 294 Difficulties could arise, for example, if Maori wished to
 concentrate 
operations less profitably in a particular locality because of high Maori u
nemployment 
there; or if Maori wished voluntarily to fish for less than the quota allotm
ent through 
concern for the state of the resource. There is an issue here unexplored: c
an "a commercial 
enterprise of this nature ... be adapted to meet fundamentally non-comm
ercial needs"?295 
Thirdly, the ongoing value of fishing quota may be questioned. The valu
e of quota is not a 
constant, but is detennined by the state of the resource, the market dema
nd for that 
resource, and the rentals which must be made to the government for its u
se. This factor 
would not, however, appear to have been taken into account by the Crow
n and Maori. 
Both have assumed that the value of new quota will rise dramatically.
296 Maori have also 
assumed that resource rentals paid for the use of fishing quota will stay t
he same. There 
is, however, the potential for the Crown to raise the rentals to market lev
els, and thus to 
cut the value of the settlement for Maori. There is nothing to prevent this
 in either the 
Fisheries Act 1983, the Deed of Settlement, or the Settlement Act Furth
er, Treasury has 
been attempting to raise the rentals to a maximum market value since the
 mid-1980' s, and 
almost simultaneously with the conclusion of the Sealord deal, the Crow
n announced 
292P Tumahai "Maoridom Seeks Lord of the Sea" Te Maori News, October 199
3, 13. 
293Kelsey Rolling Back the State, above n49, 266; Mr Prebble. New Zealand P
arliamentary Debates Vol 
532. 1992: 12959. 
294Kelsey, Rolling Back the State, above n49, 265. 
295Kelsey, Rolling Back the Stare, above n49, 267. Similar questions had been
 raised concerning AH., 
which was resented by many as the Crown's imposition of a development m
odel on Maori: S 
Jones, interview with the writer, 1 July 1993. 
296See Mr Kidd, above n200. Mr O'Regan has stated that he believes new quota 
to be in total a larger 
asset than Sealord itself: "Tipene talks on hooking the big one", above n7. 
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plans to adjust the rentals to cover administrative costs of the fisheries regime, in lin
e with 
"user pays."297 
Fourthly, shares and quota do not, by themselves, restore a viable economic base. T
here 
must be doubt as to the ability of tribes to transform their allocations into an asset w
ith a 
real and discernible effect on Maori society. Many tribes will not be able to use the q
uota 
they are allocated: the share they receive may be uneconomic; they may not have the
 capital 
or expertise to develop it themselves. 298 Iwi will thus be forced to enter into joint 
ventures, or to lease out their quota to others, thereby losing control and, often, the
 
opponunity to restore their own people in the business and activity of fishing. The 
danger 
was emphasised by the Rt Hon M Moore, Leader of the Labour Opposition:
299 
There is a danger that Sealord Products will become like a social welfare departmen
t that sends 
out cheques. There bas to be more to it than that I want in my lifetime to see as ma
ny Maori 
fishing and looking after their families as there have been lawyers carrying those peo
ple' s briefs 
and supporting their families through their involvement in treaty legislation. 
iii Development of the base 
There is an ongoing obligation on the Crown to ensure the successful development 
of the 
tribal base. In the Sealord deal, however, the Crown purports to fully satisfy its Tre
aty 
obligations by passing the settlement assets to Maori. This is not in accord with its Treaty 
responsibilities. The Crown must continue to monitor and guide the process of triba
l 
restoration. 
c Tribal structure 
Tribal restoration also requires the reconstruction of a structure appropriate for the n
eeds 
of Maori in 1993. The Sealord deal has proceeded without grappling with this issue
. We 
consider here the difficulties this poses for the efficacy of the Sealord deal. 
300 
297Kelsey, Rolling Back the State, above n49, 267. See "Fishing rental plan intolerabl
e, says Sealord 
chief' The Dominion, Wellington, 19 August 1993, 10. 
298Mr Graham made this clear when explaining why individual iwi settlements were in
appropriate: 
At the end of the day we would have ended up with fragmentation of quota among
 numbers of 
iwi or hapu, none of whom would have bad the financial strength to foot it in a 
market I.hat 
requires a lot of capital. (New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol 532, 1992: 12823
.) 
He did not explain how the global Sealord settlement would, in practice, be any differ
ent. 
299New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol 529. 1992: 11219. 
300We have seen some of these already in I.he context of representation and ratificatio
n: above Part IV A 2 
b. 
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First, the fisheries settlement assets are to be allocated amongst "Maori" . This raises 
significant issues. Should assets be allocated to iwi or hapu? The Maori Fisheries 
Commission had earlier opted for iwi,30l and this may be consistent with Treaty 
principles as discussed above. Further, if assets are to be allocated to iwi, which groups 
constitute iwi? The Maori Fisheries Commission was developing criteria by which to 
determine this, but they had not been debated. 302 The scope of the problem had been 
emphasised, however, by the Commission in July 1992 when it reported that " the iwi 
register now stands at 60 and grows by the week."303 
Secondly, the Sealord deal has highlighted the need for appropriate administrative and 
legal structures. Tribes need a basis on which to manage and develop the settlement 
assets, and to be accountable to their members for their actions. Tribal structures will also 
be needed to enable iwi to exercise autonomous functions, such as these under the 
traditional fishing regulations which involve iwi providing enforcement officers and 
fulfilling reporting obligations. 
Thirdly, the issue of distribution of benefits is left untouched. A major purpose of Treaty 
claims settlement is to improve the lot of all Maori. The Sealord deal must benefit not only 
those who run the companies, but also those who live in their traditional territories, those 
who live in the cities, those who live in marginal social and economic circumstances. 
Many have questioned, however, whether this will occur. Kelsey points to the experience 
of the Maori Development Corporation:304 
Even where these large commercial invescments were successful there was scepticism about 
how far lhey would benefit most Maori. They auempt.ed to compensate for lhe grossly unlevel 
playing field by minimally increasing commercial opportunities for enterprising Maori and iwi 
301Toe Commission stated: 
Though fishing rights might have belonged to a whanau or hapu. lhe Commission lhinks it 
should transfer lhe quota to iwi because iwi is the group representing all its whanau and hapu. 
The allocation (and use) wilhin lhe iwi is lhe business of particular iwi . (Maori Fisheries 
Corrunission,letter to all iwi, dated 29 July 1992.) 
302Toe Commission had informed iwi that it would need to be satisfied that an iwi had lhe following 
characteristics: shared descent form Tipuna; Hapu, Marae; belonging historically to a Takiwa: 
an 
existence traditionally acknowledged by oilier Iwi; and lhe representation of lhe uibal group 
by 
legal entity which tribe members have agreed should hold quota, cash, and shares for lhem, whi
ch 
acts for lhem, and which has a way of accounting to lhe tribe. (Maori Fisheries Commission lett
er, 
above n301; Tangaroa, Special Issue for 1992 AGM of lhe Maori Fisheries Commission, July
 
1992, 2.) 
303Tangaroa. Issue 10, July 1992, 1. 
304Kelsey, Rolling Back the State, above n49, 251. See also Mr Peters who argues that Treary claims
 
settlements are doing little for ordinary Maori . The process. he says, has been captured by a small 
group of Maori men who tend to show by lheir actions that they alone know what is good for 
Maori. and who are practising a brown version of "trickle down" economics: S Kilroy "Treaty 
settlements slammed" The Dominion. Wellington, 9 August 1993, 2. 
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to participate in the market economy. Toe mass of Maori would remain dependent on the 
"trickle down" of cash flows that resulted form these invesnnents, with no guarantee of income, 
jobs or tribal control of resources and development the entrepreneurial vision seemed a long 
way form the desperate situation facing the majority of rural and urban Maori. 
There has been no attempt to grapple with questions of tribal responsibility and tribal 
structures which identify members and their needs. 
Structure is of fundamental significance. The Sealord deal, however, proceeds withom 
addressing the issue. This threatens the legitimacy of the deal for all Maori. 
d Conclusion 
The Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed Maori rangatiratanga. We established at the outset that 
restoration of the tribe must now be the Crown's overarching objective. The Sealord deal, 
however, fails to deal with the issues surrounding rangatiratanga. There is no Crown 
commitment to tribal restoration as the aim of Treaty claims settlement All that the Sealord 
deal has done is to provide an amount of assets, to present it to Maori as a whole, and to 
hope that the tribe will thence be restored. There must be no further settlements in this 
mould. 
D Overview 
The Treaty of W aitangi is New Zealand's constitutional foundation and the basis for our 
bicultural nationhood. It provides the framework by which we may redress past 
grievances and honour the Treaty in the circumstances of 1993. 
The Sealord deal is in breach of the Treaty of Waitangi. There are key respects in which it 
directly contravenes Treaty principles. It fails to uphold the Treaty as a fundamental 
constitutional document conferring ongoing rights and laying the basis for a developing 
partnership; it allows the Crown to exceed the legitimate bounds of kawanatanga. Further, 
the Crown has made no commitment to a legitimate Treaty claims process, to redress the 
imbalance of bargaining power in negotiations, or to build public understanding of Treaty 
claims settlements. Underlying the Sealord deal is a failure to grapple with the "hard 
questions" surrounding the requirements of the Treaty in 1993. There are major issues 
surrounding the restoration of rangatiratanga which have gone unaddressed. There are 
ongoing difficulties with the representation and ratification of settlements. Failure to attend 
to these questions threatens the legitimacy of all future claims resolution. 
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We conclude, therefore, that the Sealord deal is not a appropriate fulfilment of the T
reaty 
of W aitangi in 1993. It must not be a model for future Treaty claims settlements. 
V THE SEALORD DIRECTION 
The Sealord deal is a "historic settlement." It acknowledges Treaty fishing rights an
d 
satisfies them by giving Maori a major stake in the New Zealand fishing industry, a
nd an 
opportunity for development The Sealord deal is the first major settlement of Maor
i 
Treaty claims and is hailed as laying the way for more. It is, however, in breach of the 
Treaty of W aitangi. 
What is involved in the Sealord deal is the balance between principle and practice, theory 
and results. There is a tension in the deal "that reflects in part a desire on the one ha
nd to 
seize the opportunity, and, on the other, to maintain the integrity of the Treaty."305
 The 
Crown and Maori chose opportunity. As Tipene O'Regan justified the decision:
306 
Concepts are lovely things, they're like grievances, they're like tears. You can m
assage them. 
you can nurse them, you can allow them to define you, but at the end of the day, 
if they are to 
have any meaning at all, they have to be translated into fact. ... If [the Treaty] is going
 to be 
relevant in terms of our people's future, the economic rights it enshrines must be
 translated 
into a set of assets capable of generating benefits for the tribe. 
The Sealord deal was the best Maori were likely to do. They would take the chance
 to 
develop, and, in time, buy back Treaty principle:
307 
I think it was not what Maori were due in terms of their Treaty rights, but I take the view that
 
we will get to the goal of 50 percent we set ourselves in 1988 far quicker by good
 commercial 
management., than what we will ever get there grinding away at high cost in long liti
gation. 
This decision to accept the Sealord deal is understandable. The Crown should not, 
however, have put Maori in the position of having to make it The Treaty of W aitangi is 
the basis on which New Zealand will move beyond colonialism towards bicultural 
nationhood. The hard questions must be grappled with in order to achieve a just, 
305 Fisheries Settlement, 3. 
306Quoted in "Who Are Ngai TahuT', above n59, 59. 
307''Tipene Talks on Hooking the Big One", above n7, . 
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legitimate, stable, future. The Treaty of W aitangi itself strikes the appropriate balance
 
between principles and practice, theory and results. 
The Sealord direction is thus the wrong direction. It only invites the recurrence of
 the 
demand to "honour the Treaty". The Crown has risked long-term justice for short-term 
results and the potential for future grievance, illegitimacy, and injustice; Maori have 
gambled on the Sealord settlement being the "window of opportunity" for disposs
essed 
Maori and the first step towards Maori forcing change themselves. 'The Sealord deal has
, 
however, failed to lay the foundations for real change. Indeed. it may well come to stand 
as an ineluctable barrier to self-determination and bicultural nationhood. The ultim
ate price 
of the Sealord deal may be the legitimation of continued Maori subordination. It is the 
purists who are indeed the realists.308 
The Sealord direction is not an appropriate direction for New Zealand in 1993. W
e have 
not waited 150 years to dishonour the Treaty of Waitangi. The Sealord deal must 
be 
rejected as the basis for future Treaty claims settlements. 
308Kelsey, Honouring rhe Treaty, above n98, 270. 
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APPENDIX 
New Zealand Fishing Legislation 1860 - 1986 
The Crown has regulated the New Zealand fishing resource 
for a number of reasons: 
conservation, management, and promotion of the New Zeala
nd fishing industry. 
Early legislation focused on the commercial and subsistence
 oyster fishery,l on 
introduced species such as trout and salmon,2 and on sea fis
heries generally.3 This 
legislation was consolidated in the Fisheries Act 1908 which
 remained in force until 
1983.4 The Fisheries Act 1908 contained basic management
 and control powers to 
regulate such matters as closed seasons, closed and restricte
d areas, minimum fish siz.es, 
minimum mesh size of nets, prohibition of certain fishing ge
ar, and the appointment of 
inspectors. These were the basic means by which the Crown
 managed the fishing 
resource. 
The New Zealand fishing industry began its major developm
ent from the early 1900's. 
By the 1930's, however, problems with the industry infrastr
ucture had begun to develop 
and there was concern about declining fish stocks resulting f
rom trawling. Restricted 
licensing was therefore introduced as a means of manageme
nt5 Licensing was the major 
basis of fishery conservation in the 1940's and 1950's, along 
with the pre-existing 
Fisheries Act methods. 
By 1960, the industry had changed: new technology was op
ening up fishing potential,
6 
there were new foreign operators to deal with,7 and there wa
s doubt about the continued 
efficacy of the licensing system. The Government sought the
 best means both of 
accelerating the expansion of the fishing industry, and of con
tinuing to conserve the 
resource. In 1963, it abolished restrictive licensing and the se
as were opened to all who 
1Toe Oyster Fisheries Act 18fi6, amended in 1869 and 1874; the Oyst
er Fisheries Act 1892; the Sea-
fisheries Act 1894. 
2Toe Salmon and Trout Act 1867; the Fisheries Conservation A
mendment Act 1903. 
3Toe Fish Protection Act 1877; the Seal Fisheries Protection A
ct 1878; the Fisheries Conservation Act 
1884; the Fisheries Encouragement Act 1885; the Sea-fisherie
s Act 1894, amended 1896, 1903, 
1907. 
4Toe Fisheries Act received some minor additions in 1912 and 1923, b
ut, apart from those, remained 
almost unchanged until 1945. 
5Toe previous practice had been that anyone who wished to fish
 could do so, subject to registering the 
vessel. Licensing was introduced by the Industrial Efficiency A
ct 1936, and its provisions were 
transferred into the Fisheries Act 1908 in 1945. 
6The new technology, with developments such as on-board
 refrigeration and echo-sounding 
equipment, was enabling increasing number of boats to 
range further afield, and to 
explore new fisheries in deeper waters and further offs
hore. 
7Japanese fishing operations had begun in New Zealand
 waters in 1959. 
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wanted to go fishing and could afford to do so. 
8 The Government provided investment 
incentives, capital grants and tax breaks to the industry: "more and
 more people were 
encouraged to spend more money to catch more fish."
9 The Territorial Sea and Fishing 
Zone Act 1965 was a further stimulus, with a nine mile fishing zon
e being established 
outside the three mile territorial sea for the exclusive use of domes
tic vessels. 10 The 
Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977 again addr
essed the problem of 
foreign fishers. giving New Zealand the power to control conserva
tion and management 
of resources out to a limit of 200 miles and requiring foreign craft 
to be licensed. 
Conservation was achieved by the traditional Fisheries Act method
s. 
By the late 1970's, however, New Zealand fishing was in trouble.
 New fishers had 
found it difficult to succeed in the deep sea fishery and had returne
d inshore. The inshore 
fishery came under intolerable pressure and commercial catches fel
l dramatically from the 
late 1970's. 11 By 1982, it was clear that a new regime was needed
. The result was a new 
Fisheries Act in 1983. 
The Fisheries Act 1983 emphasised the need to conserve the deple
ted fisheries resource 
and to bring a greater measure of economic security to the industry
. The Act provided for 
the designation of specific areas to be managed by Fishery Manage
ment Plans; 12 for 
controlled fisheries, defined by fish species, area. or those who could engage in the 
fishery to be set aside, and a maximwn nwnber of licenses granted in 
them; 13 and for the 
compulsory registration of fishing vessels and compulsory fishing
 permits for 
commercial fishers.1 4 The Act also introduced a new definition of a
 commercial fisher: a 
person who had fished for sale throughout the year, or the fishing 
season, and who had 
relied substantially on fishing for his or her income.
15 The effect of this was the 
exclusion of between 1500 and 1800 part-time fishers from the fis
hing industry. 
8Tois was recommended by the Fishing Industry Committee, a parliamen
tary select committee set up in 
1962. 
9Muriwhenua, xviii. 
10i:n the late 1960's and early 1970's, Russian, Japanese, Taiwanese and Korean fishers were here in 
large 
numbers and taking large catches from in and arolllld New Zealand 
waters. 
11 For example, catches of snapper, one of the most important of inshore species
, fell from 18 OOO tonnes 
in 1978 to 12 OOO tonnes in 1981. Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries quotes a Ministry 
of Agriculture and 
Fisheries official as saying: 
The decline in the yields of the major species placed many fishe.rmen
 and fishing companies llllder 
financial pressure. Coastal communities heavily dependent on fish
ing became at risk. Recreational 
and traditional Maori fisheries began to suffer as the fishery resource became fu
nher depleted. (21 7) 
12part I Fisheries Act 1983. 
13Part III Fisheries Act 1983. 
14Part IV Fisheries Act 1983. Fishing permits could be restricted 
to specific areas, species, 
quantities, methods, types of fishing gear and periods of time as
 fixed by the Director-
General. 
15Section 2 Fisheries Act 1983. The MAF criteria for those seeking
 comme.rcial vessel registration and 
commercial fishing permits became: 
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The Fisheries Act 1983 was not, however, 
considered to have dealt adequately with th
e 
problems of management, control or conse
rvation of New Zealand's fisheries. The 
Government thus proposed soon after its en
acunent the revolutionary new solution of a
 
quota management system. This became th
e Fisheries Amendment Act 1986. 
• that during 1982 the fisher had caught the equ
ivalent of $10 OOO of fish, or 
• the fisher held a controlled fisbe.ry license, 
or 
• approval had previously been granted in respe
ct of the new moratoriwn i:rovisions and had b
een 
used or only recently granted, <X" 
• the fisher earned at least 80% of non-investm
ent incane from fishing, or 
• the fisher held a permit for the period 1 Janua
ry-30 September 1983 and fishing income w
as a 
vital part of the fisher's annual subsistence in
come. (Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries, 219) 
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